Are You Kidding?

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Jonathan Alter, a leading Obama sycophant, appeared on a talk show recently with Washington Examiner columnist Tim Carney. The topic turned to a comment made by Rep. Darrell Issa (R-CA), who observed that Obama’s administration is “one of the most corrupt administrations ever.” Issa’s claim sent Alter into an apoplectically angry rant, saying there was “zero” evidence of corruption.

To Alter’s evident surprise, Carney immediately demurred, incredulous that Alter couldn’t see any evidence. While Carney said that Issa’s comments were “hyperbolic,” he gave a few choice illustrations, and later listed a few more on the Examiner’s website. Carney’s list included the following:

1. Ex-Google lobbyist Andrew McLaughlin, employed by the White House as a tech policy specialist, chatting with Google lobbyists about the rules governing “Net Neutrality,” from which Google stands to gain. (Carney’s blog doesn’t mention it, but Google gave lavishly to the Obama campaign.)

2. A former Goldman Sachs lobbyist took the job of the Treasury Department’s Chief of Staff within nine months of his Goldman employment. (Again, we can add that upper-level management at Goldman Sachs was a big contributor to Obama’s coffers.)

3. Former H&R Block CEO Mark Ernst was hired by Obama to help the IRS write new regulations on tax preparation (which Block subsequently endorsed, because it stands to benefit from them).

4. Obama officials have met “off-campus” repeatedly in order to dodge the Presidential Records Act.

5. When AmeriCorps Inspector General Gerald Walpin started investigating Obama’s friend and supporter Kevin Johnson, Walpin was summarily fired.

6. In the Obama-orchestrated Chrysler bankruptcy, the UAW was given the bulk of the stock in the new company (while the secured creditors were burned).  Naturally, the UAW was a big contributor to Obama’s campaign.

As good as Carney’s list is, it only scratches the surface. Here are a few more illustrations:

7. Besides the crony bankruptcy deal that gave the bulk of the stock in the new company to the UAW, there was a similar deal that gave a big chunk of the new GM stock to the UAW.

8. Moreover, in the recent IPO, the feds held onto the public’s shares while the UAW was allowed to dump its own. This ensured that the UAW pension fund would be made whole.

9. ACORN, the bogus “community service” group for which Obama was counsel and which worked so hard to register voters (even fictional ones) on Obama’s behalf, received lavish amounts of “stimulus” money.

10. When Obama was campaigning for Democrats in the last election, he doled out stimulus money in the states he visited (especially Nevada). Indeed, the stimulus fund was a grab-bag of cash for Obama’s backers. A disproportionate share of the money was spent in precisely those states that supported Obama.

As to whether Issa’s statement was “hyperbolic,” I don’t think so. The Obama administration has racked up a lot of corruption in its two years in office. If it isn’t one of the most corrupt administrations in history, it is surely on track to become so.




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Latin America: Autumn of the Antipodes?

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In response to last November’s flooding, mudslides, and destruction of homes that left tens of thousands of Venezuelans destitute in makeshift shelters, Hugo Chávez went camping to show solidarity with his people. The luxurious tent was a gift from Libyan strongman Muammar Gaddafi. Piling insult atop bad grace, Chávez was photographed inspecting the devastation in a Cuban(!) military uniform. He is not one to dwell on the negative. Instead of looking grave, concerned, and statesmanlike, he pursed his lips and spread his cheeks in a smirk that bordered on the manic, sticking his head out the window of a Jeep like a dog without good sense. Not since Mexican President Antonio López de Santa Anna (he of the Alamo) buried his leg with full military honors has a Latin American leader been this much fun.

But for Chávez, the bigger crisis is his impending loss of power. Though the 2010 parliamentary elections netted his United Socialist Party 95 seats, the opposition, successfully united, won 64 seats, thus depriving Chávez of the two-thirds and three-fifths majorities required to pass organic and enabling legislation or fiddle further with the constitution. But never mind, Hugo has a plan.

He requested that the lame-duck legislators grant him unlimited powers to rule by decree for 18 months, limit legislative sessions to four days a month, turn control of all parliamentary commissions over to the executive branch, limit parliamentary speeches to 15 minutes per member, restrict broadcasts of assembly debates to only government channels, and penalize party-switching by legislators with the loss of their seats. The lame duck legislators dutifully complied. Vice President Elías Jaua says the powers are necessaryto pass laws dealing with vital services after the disaster and with such areas as infrastructure, land use, banking, defense and the “socio-economic system of the nation.” For good measure, the lame-duck Chavista legislature also passed a law barring non-governmental organizations such ashuman rights groupsfrom receiving US funding; another law terminating the autonomy of universities; more broadcasting and telecommunications controls; and the creation of “socialist communes” to bypass local governments.

Not since Santa Anna buried his leg with full military honors has a Latin American leader been this much fun.

Opposition newspaper editor Teodoro Petkoff called it a “Christmas ambush,” writing in his daily Tal Cual that Chavez is preparing totalitarian measures that amount to “a brutal attack . . . against democratic life.” Chavez’s end-run around the new National Assembly, which convened on January 5, was blatantly illegal, as such emergency powers can only be granted by the legislature to cover a period within the term of the legislature in office. Chávez demanded powers that extend well beyond the previous legislature’s term and effectively emasculate the new legislature, which would never have given him the two-thirds vote he would need, since 40% of its members are in opposition. Venezuelans have reacted with roadblocks and peaceful but energetic massive resistance. Security forces and government thugs have counter-reacted violently. Many people have been injured, not only physically, but economically as well. On New Year's Eve the Bolivar was halved in value, from 2.6 to the dollar to 4.3.

The most infamous precedent for this maneuver was the German Reichstag’s March 1933 enabling law granting Adolf Hitler the right to enact laws by decree for four years, making him dictator of Germany. No doubt the affair will end up in court — decided by Chávez-appointed judges. Still, it’s only a matter of time before the ship of state either turns or crashes.

By contrast, Sebastián Piñera, Chile’s new president, responded to the March 2010 earthquake with grace and alacrity; and six months later rallied the country behind the 33 miners trapped for 70 days in a deep mine cave-in. Unlike President Obama, in his autarkic response to the BP fiasco, Piñera requested and received international assistance. But Piñera is perhaps more notable as the poster boy of a subtle, newly evolving trend throughout Latin America, a trend only now being recognized: the “normalization” of its politics.

Normalization means the peaceful alternation of center-left with center-right governments, which is the status quo in most developed, liberal democracies. Piñera, a center-right candidate, followed two decades of center-left government.

By definition, normalization is dull, boring, and bereft of transformational ideals. But it is nonetheless great news, especially when compared to the radical swings of the past, when left-wing revolutions followed right-wing golpes de estado (or vice versa). The inevitable mayhem, war, and death were always followed by authoritarian regimes.

Chávez demanded powers that extend well beyond the previous legislature’s term and effectively emasculate the new legislature.

In Chile, the Marxist government of Salvador Allende, which had begun to forcibly expropriate property, was overthrown by a military coup after inflation exceeded 140%. To restore order, General Augusto Pinochet brutally imposed a right-wing authoritarian regime. To his credit, however, he laid the groundwork for the political and fiscal stability Chile now enjoys. He invited the so-called Chicago Boys — Milton Friedman and his acolytes — to design a stable and prosperous economic framework, and he relinquished power slowly and honestly by means of a new constitution and open plebiscites. In 1989, Pinochet lost an election to the Concertación, the center-left coalition that would hold power until Piñera’s election.

As Fernando Mires, a Chilean political science professor at the University of Oldenburg, Germany, has observed, “Everything that does not directly deal with war and death, is a game.” Politics is a game, and games require rules. Once war and death enter the scene, the game of politics is over. Latin America is now anteing up to the table. Though not always perfectly correlated, political stability goes hand-in-hand with some degree of fiscal and institutional stability — preconditions for people’s ability to lead healthy, productive lives.

Independence and Chaos

When Father Miguel Hidalgo’s Grito de Dolores declared Mexican independence from Spain on September 16, 1810, it began a protracted independence movement throughout the continent. Two days later, Chile, at the other end of Latin America, instituted de facto home rule. To be sure, Haiti had already defeated Napoleon in 1804 to gain independence, and Cuba would throw off Spanish rule with US help as late as 1898 (and, some would argue, didn’t actually achieve full independence until the Castro regime nullified the Platt Amendment, which gave the US Congress a veto power over foreign affairs). But the main course of events took place within two decades.

In 1821, Spain recognized Mexico’s independence. By 1823, after it had recognized the independence of much of the rest of Latin America (with Portugal ceding Brazil in 1822), US president James Monroe felt comfortable enough to declare the Americas a European-free zone, in spite of Spanish forces still holding out in what was to become Bolivia.

Latin American independence movements were products of the Enlightenment, influenced by the US Declaration of Independence and subsequent constitution — in the context of the times, left-wing revolutions. But, as Marxist commentators never fail to decry, the American revolutions were not “true,” social revolutions, but rather bourgeois realignments. The original Spanish conquest had left most of the basic indigenous structures of authority intact, replacing Moctezuma and Atahualpa with the throne of Madrid. Latin American independence movements recapitulated that strategy, replacing the Spanish aristocracy with homegrown landed gentry.

Meanwhile, a new model of revolution had emerged: the French Revolution, in which the ideals of the Enlightenment metastasized into a nightmare. The monarchy was decapitated; the ancien regime gone; an empire was founded. Traditional concepts of how societies ought to be organized had been put aside.

In Latin America, would-be liberators, criticized from both Right and Left, became disillusioned and turned away from democracy. Up north, Agustín de Iturbide, the Mexican heir of a wealthy Spanish father, switched sides to fight for Mexican independence and declared himself emperor of Mexico; Santa Anna, another side-switcher, overthrew him and established a republic, then a dictatorship. Santa Anna ended up ruling Mexico on 11 non-consecutive occasions over a period of 22 years. Asked about the loss of his republican ideals, he declared,

It is very true that I threw up my cap for liberty with great ardor, and perfect sincerity, but very soon found the folly of it. A hundred years to come my people will not be fit for liberty. They do not know what it is, unenlightened as they are, and under the influence of a Catholic clergy, a despotism is the proper government for them, but there is no reason why it should not be a wise and virtuous one.

This general sentiment came to be shared by most of Latin America’s liberators.

Meanwhile, Central America (including the Mexican state of Chiapas but excluding Panama), and known as the Captaincy General of Guatemala, seceded from Mexico, becoming “The Federal Republic of Central America” after a short-lived land grab by Mexican Emperor Iturbide who pictured his empire extending from British Columbia to the other Colombia. The Federal Republic didn’t last. In the 1830s Rafael Carrera, led a revolt that sundered it. By 1838, Carrera ruled Guatemala; in the 1860’s he briefly controlled El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua as well, though they remained nominally independent.

Not one to be left behind, the Dominican Republic jumped on the bandwagon in 1821, but was quickly invaded by Haiti. Not until 1844 was the eastern half of Santo Domingo able to go its own way. Sandwiched between Cuba and Puerto Rico (both still held by Spain), in 1861 the Dominican Republic — in a move unique in all Latin America — requested recolonization, having found the post-independence chaos untenable. Spain gladly acquiesced. The US protested but, mired in its own civil war, was unable to enforce the Monroe Doctrine. In 1865, the Dominican Republic declared independence for a second time.

Sebastián Piñera, Chile’s new president, represents a subtle trend only now being recognized: the “normalization” of Latin American politics.

South America fared no better. Simon Bolívar, after a series of brilliant campaigns that criss-crossed the continent, created the unstable Gran Colombia, a state encompassing modern Colombia, Panama, Venezuela, and Ecuador, with himself as president — a model Hugo Chávez aspires to emulate. Bolívar then headed to Peru, to wrest power from Joséde San Martín, its liberator. Bolívar was declared dictator, but the Spanish still held what is now Bolivia. He finished San Martín’s job by liberating it and separating it from Peru. The new state was christened with his name. By 1828, Gran Colombia proved unmanageable, so Bolívar declared himself dictator, a move that ended in failure and more chaos.

Southern South America was liberated by San Maríin and Bernardo O’Higgins, with Chile and Argentina going their separate ways. In Chile, Bernardo O’Higgins turned from Supreme Director into dictator, was ousted, and was replaced by another dictator. A disgusted San Martín exiled himself to Europe, abandoning Argentina to a fate of civil war and strongmen. Uruguay and Paraguay carved themselves a niche — but only after Uruguay’s sovereignty had been contested by newly independent Brazil. In Paraguay, José Rodriguez de Francia, Consul of Paraguay (a title unique to Latin America) became in 1816 “El Supremo” for life. An admirer of the French revolution — and in particular of Rousseau and Robespierre — he imposed an extreme autarky, closing Paraguay’s borders to all trade and travel; abolishing all military ranks above captain, and insisting that he personally officiate at all weddings. He also ordered all dogs in the country to be shot.

Strongmen and Stability

The Latin American wars of independence were succeeded by aborted attempts at unity or secession; wars of conquest, honor, and spite; land grabs, big and little uprisings, civil wars; experiments in democracy, republicanism, federation, dictatorship, monarchy, anarchy, and rule by warlords or filibusters; and even reversion to colonialism; all with radical “left-right” swings — in a word, by every imaginable state of affairs, none long lasting. It all culminated in the era of the caudillo: a populist military strongman, usually eccentric, sentimental, long-ruling, and (roughly speaking) right-wing.

In his novel Autumn of the Patriarch, Colombian author (and confidante of Fidel Castro) Gabriel García Márquez offers a profile of a caudillo that has yet to be surpassed. The stream-of-consciousness, 270-page, 6-sentence prose “poem on the solitude of power” was based on Colombia’s Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (1953–57) and Venezuela’s Juan Vicente Gómez (1908–1935), with dashes of Franco and Stalin thrown in. But its indeterminate timelessness, stretching from who-knows-when to forever, also evokes Mexico’s Porfirio Díaz (1876–1911), Paraguay’s Alfredo Stroessner (1954–89), the Dominican Republic’s Rafael Trujillo (1930–61), and Nicaragua’s Anastasio Somoza (1936–56). It could also easily include Brazil’s Getulio Vargas (1930-54), Argentina’s Juan Perón (1946–55 and 1973–76), Haiti’s “Papa Doc” and “Baby Doc” Duvalier (1957–86), and, yes, the longest ruling military strongman of all — Fidel Castro (1959–201?).

The caudillo period had no specific time frame; it was rather a response to instability (or injustice, in the case of left-caudillos) that varied over time, country, and cultural conditions. Take Mexico for example. Besides the usual post-independence chaos, it also suffered invasions from the US and France. So, in 1846, Porfirio Díaz, an innkeeper’s son and sometime theology student, left his law studies to join the army — first, to fight the US, then to fight Santa Anna in one of the latter’s multiple bids for power, and finally to fight the French-imposed Emperor Maximilian.

Politics is a game, and games require rules. Once war and death enter the scene, the game of politics is over.

In the war against Maxmillian, Díaz rose to become division general under Benito Juárez’ leadership but retired after Mexican forces triumphed and Juárez assumed the presidency in 1868. It didn’t take long for Díaz to become disillusioned. One principle that had developed in Mexican politics and ironically — especially considering the nearly 35 years in power that Díaz would enjoy — became institutionalized, was one-term presidential term limits. So when Juárez announced for a second term in 1870, Díaz opposed him. Losing, he cried fraud and issued a pronunciamento, a formal declaration of insurrection and plan of action accompanied by the pomp and publicity emblematic of Mexican politics. After another pronunciamento and additional revolts much politicking, and a term in Congress, Díaz succeeded in ousting his adversaries. He was elected president in 1877. Having based his campaign on a platform of “no reelection," he reluctantly stepped aside after one term and turned over the presidency to an underling, whose incompetence and corruption ensured Díaz’s victory in the 1884 contest.

He set out to establish a pax Porfiriana by (as he termed it) eliminating divisive politics and focusing on administration. The former was achieved by stuffing the legislature, the courts, and high government offices with cronies; making all local jurisdictions answerable to him; instituting a “pan o palo” (bread or a beating) policy, enforced by strong military and police forces; artfully playing the various entrenched interests against each other; and stealing every election. Porfirio Díaz opened Mexico up to foreign investment, built roads and public works, stabilized the currency, and developed the country to such a degree that it was compared economically to Germany and France.

Classifying caudillos as Left or Right is not always easy. Caudillos who focused on economic development, fiscal stability, and monumental public works are generally perceived as right-wing, while those who improved education, fought church privilege, or imposed economic controls are perceived as left-wing. Nearly all were initially motivated by idealism, followed by disillusionment with democracy and addiction to power. Nearly all lined their pockets. Venezuela alone, between 1830 and 1899, experienced nearly 70 years of serial caudillo rule, which, some would argue, continued intermittently to the present.

In Ecuador, 35 right-wing years initiated by a caudillo were followed by 35 left-wing years initiated by another caudillo. General Gabriel García Moreno had saved the country from disintegration in 1859 and established a Conservative regime that wasn’t overthrown until 1895, when Eloy Alfaro led an anti-clerical coup. Alfaro secularized Ecuador, guaranteed freedom of speech, built schools and hospitals, and completed the Trans-Andean Railroad connecting the coast with the highlands. In 1911, his own party overthrew him and further liberalized the regime by opening up the economy. The Liberal Era lasted until 1925. Altogether, Alfaro initiated four coups — two succeeded, and one finally killed him — that made him the idol of Rafael Correa, Ecuador’s present, left-wing, president.

One right-wing caudillo, the Dominican Republic’s Rafael Trujillo (1930–61), was prematurely Green, restricting deforestation and establishing national parks and conservation areas in response to the ravages in next-door Haiti. His successor (after a five-year, chaotic interregnum that included a civil war and US Marines) was Joaquín Balaguer, an authoritarian who dominated Dominican politics until 2000 and continued Trujillo’s conservation policies.

Some caudillos combined elements from both Left and Right, coming up with ideologies that were internally inconsistent but extremely popular. Argentina’s Perón absorbed fascism, national socialism and falangism while stationed as a military observer in Italy, Germany, and Spain. Back in Argentina he allied himself with both the socialist and the syndicalist labor movements to create a power base. In 1943, as a colonel, he joined the coup against conservative president Ramon Castillo, who had been elected fraudulently.

In Paraguay, José Rodriguez de Francia closed the borders to all trade and travel; abolished all military ranks above captain, and insisted that he personallyofficiate at all weddings. He also ordered all dogs in the country to be shot.

When Perón announced his candidacy for the 1945 presidential elections as the Labor Party candidate, the centrist Allied Civic Union, the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, and the conservative National Autonomous Party all united against him — to no effect. As president, his stated goals were social justice and economic independence; in fact, he greatly expanded social programs, gave women the vote, created the largest unionized labor force in Latin America, and went on a spending spree that nearly bankrupted Argentina (it included modernizing the armed forces, paying off most of the nation’s debt, and making Christmas bonuses mandatory). Perón also nationalized the central bank, railways, shipping, universities, utilities, and the wholesale grain market. By 1951, the peso had lost 70% of its purchasing power, and inflation had reached 50%.

During the Cold War, Perón refused to pick either capitalism or communism, instituting instead his “third way," an attempt to ally Argentina with both the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, Peronism remains a vital force in Argentina, with President Cristina Fernández at its helm.

Sandino Lives!

Not that caudillismo needed any intellectual justification, but the social Darwinism that developed during the late 19th century helped to rationalize many of the abuses committed under its aegis. Then, fast on its heels and in rebuttal to it, Marxism burst on the scene, invigorating the Left by advocating the forcible redistribution of wealth. The Left-Right divide widened, and conflict sharpened.

In 1910, old and ambivalent about retiring, Porfirio Díaz decided to run once more for president of Mexico. When he realized that his opponent, Francisco Madero, was set to win, he jailed him on election day and declared himself the winner by a landslide. But Madero escaped and, from San Antonio, Texas, issued his Plan de San Luis Potosí, a pronunciamento promising land reform. It ignited the Mexican Revolution.

The Zapatista Army of National Liberation now sells t-shirts and trinkets to finance its anti-capitalist jihad.

Though not specifically Marxist, the Mexican Revolution has been interpreted as the precursor to the Russian Revolution. Its ideologies — especially “Zapatismo” — are part of the progressive, Fabian, and socialist zeitgeist of the time. In fact, however, the Mexican Revolution — a many-sided civil war that lasted ten years — was so indigenously Mexican as to elude historians’ broader interpretive models. Yet it was the first effective and long-lasting leftist Latin American movement. Its successors are Cuban communism, liberation theology, Bolivarian socialism, and many others. Out of it coalesced Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), heir to a coalition of forces and ideologies that were, at last, fed up with fighting. The PRI, a member of the Socialist International, instituted de facto one-party rule, and controlled Mexico for over 70 years.

Other radical leftist revolutionary movements followed — some sooner, some later, not all successful — operating either by force or through the ballot. The earliest (1927) was that of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Augusto César Sandino identified closely with the Mexican Revolution. Although he was not a Marxist, his movement adopted that ideology after his death. Five years later, in next-door El Salvador, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Martí was a Communist Party member and former Sandinista) rose in revolt. Guatemala followed in 1944 with the Jacobo Arbenz coup, then Cuba in 1952 with Castro’s insurrection.

With Castro’s accession to power in 1959, the outbreak of Marxist revolts in Latin America intensified. During the 1960s the Tupamaros rose in Uruguay. In Peru, various groups, including the Shining Path, revolted. The FARC, ELN, and M-19 followed in Colombia. In 1967, Fidel’s own Che Guevara met his death while trying to organize a premature revolution in Bolivia. Then, in 1970, Chileans voted in — by only 36%, a plurality in a three-way race — the first elected Marxist regime in the Americas.

Venezuela was next. Hugo Chávez launched his first, unsuccessful coup in 1992. After a stint in jail he was pardoned, ran for president in 1998, and won.

In Bolivia, Evo Morales, a former trade union leader, and his Movement Toward Socialism won the 2005 elections with a majority.

Latin American Marxism, unlike the European sort, has little to do with the industrial revolution or conditions of the working class. Not only is it currently more tolerant of religious belief; it is more relaxed about ideology and — again, currently — lacks gulags and killing fields. It is more about land distribution and “Social Justice” — a term whose words, innocuous and benign in themselves, don bandoliers and carbines and become fighting words when capitalized.

Social Justice is the concept of creating a society based on the principles of equality, human rights, and a “living wage” through progressive taxation, income and property redistribution, and force; and of manufacturing equality of outcome even in cases where incidental inequalities appear in a procedurally just system.

The term and modern concept of "social justice" were created by a Jesuit in 1840 and further elaborated by moral theologians. In 1971 Peruvian priest Gustavo Gutiérrez justified the use of force in achieving Social Justice when he made it a cornerstone of his liberation theology. As a strictly secular concept, Social Justice was adopted and promulgated by philosopher John Rawls.

The Other Path

Mario Vargas Llosa is a Peruvian writer and 2010 Nobel laureate — pointedly awarded the prize for his literary oeuvre, as opposed to his political writings, but this from a committee that awarded Barack Obama a Peace Prize for nothing more than political penumbras and emanations. Vargas Llosa started as a man of the Left. His hegira from admirer of Fidel Castro to radical neoliberal candidate for president of Peru in 1990 is a metaphor for Latin America’s own swing of the pendulum today.

In 1971 he condemned the Castro regime. Five years later, he punched García Márquez (patriarch of Marxist apologists) in the eye. Their rupture has never been fully healed (or explained), but it is attributed by some to diverging political differences. In 1989, when Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto published his libertarian classic, The Other Path (an ironic allusion to the Shining Path guerrilla movement), Vargas Llosa wrote its stirring introduction. He and de Soto advocated individual private property rights as a solution to property claims by the Latin American poor and Indians. Both the fuzzy squatters’ rights of the urban poor and the traditional subsistence-area claims of indigenous communities were being — literally — bulldozed by corrupt or insensitive governments; the two authors believed that the individual occupiers of the land should own it as their private property. This proposed solution did not sit well with the Social Justice crowd. To them, communal rights trumped individual rights.

But it struck a chord with the poor and dispossessed. So Vargas Llosa declared for the presidency in 1990 on a radical libertarian reform platform (the Liberty Movement). In Peru, the Shining Path guerrillas were terrorizing the country and the economy was a disaster, having been run into the ground by left-wing populist Alan García, who was now running for reelection. In the outside world, Soviet communism and its outliers were disintegrating, both institutionally and ideologically. Between García and Vargas Llosa in the three-way race stood Alberto Fujimori, the center-right candidate. Vargas Llosa took the first round with 34%, nearly the same majority that had put Allende into office in next-door Chile. But he lost the runoff, handing Peru over to the authoritarianism (as well as the reforms) of the Fujimori regime.

Latin American politics culminated in the era of the caudillo: a populist military strongman, usually eccentric, sentimental, long-ruling, and (roughly speaking) right-wing.

Without skipping a beat and less than a month later, Vargas Llosa attended a conference in Mexico City entitled "The 20th Century: The Experience of Freedom." This conference focused on the collapse of communist rule in central and eastern Europe. It was broadcast on Mexican television and reached most of Latin America. There Vargas Llosa condemned the Mexican system of power, the 61-year rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party, and coined “the phrase that circled the globe”: "Mexico is the perfect dictatorship.” “The perfect dictatorship,” he said, “is not communism, not the USSR, not Fidel Castro; the perfect dictatorship is Mexico. Because it is a camouflaged dictatorship."

But the “perfect dictatorship” was already loosening its grip. Recent PRI presidents had been well-degreed in economics and public administration, as opposed to politics and law. They had already moved Mexico rightward, to the center-left, by privatizing some industries and liberalizing the economy — especially by joining NAFTA. By the 1994 election, the PRI had opened up the electoral system to outside challengers: the center-right National Action Party (PAN) and the strong-left Party of the Democratic Republic (PRD). In the 2000 elections the PRI ceded power to the PAN’s Vicente Fox, though not entirely.

The popular but hapless Fox ended Mexico’s last Marxist uprising, Subcomandante Marcos’ Zapatista Army of National Liberation (they now sell t-shirts and trinkets to finance their anti-capitalist jihad). But he was unable to further the rest of his reform agenda through the PRI-controlled legislature. So Mexico reelected the PAN in 2006. Today, in a move emblematic of Latin America’s change to European-style, alternating center-left/center-right administrations, the PAN and the PRD are exploring avenues of cooperation to pass legislation through the PRI-controlled Congress.

But Vargas Llosa wasn’t through yet. During one of Hugo Chávez’s marathon television tirades in 2009, he challenged Vargas Llosa to a debate on how best to promote Social Justice. When Vargas Llosa accepted, Chavez — in his most humiliating public move to date — declined.

Ho-hum

Peru’s increasingly discredited Fujimori resigned because of corruption, a questionable third presidential term, and the exercise of disproportionate force, once too often. He was followed by Alejandro Toledo, an economist so centrist and dull that he bored his people into not reelecting him. By the 2006 elections, Peru’s centrist politics were entrenched in the most ironic of ways. Alan García, the disastrous, populist left-wing ex-president, ran on a center-right, neoliberal platform — and won. And against all odds, he kept his word. In 2009 Peruvian economic growth was the third highest in the world, after China and India. In 2010 it remained in double figures. The 2011 elections won’t include García, as he can’t succeed himself. They are expected to be contested by the technocratic Toledo and the center-right Keiko Fujimori, Alberto’s daughter and leader of the Fujimorista Party.

It’s much the same — with few exceptions — in the rest of Latin America. Brazil’s widly popular, fiscally prudent, and social justice-sensitive center-left Lula da Silva administration was reelected, this time led by Dilma Rouseff, Brazil’s first female president. She has promised more of the same. In next-door Paraguay, the exceptionally long-ruling (61 years) Colorado Party ceded power in 2008 to the country’s second-ever left-wing president, Fernando Lugo, an ex-bishop and proponent of liberation theology. But Lugo has moved to the center, distancing himself from Chávez and tempering his social and fiscal promises by seeking broad consensus. GDP growth in 2010 was 8.6%.

In 2009 Uruguay elected as president José Mujica, a former Tupamaro guerrilla. But Mujica, described by some as an “anti-politician,” has moved radically to the ceemnter. The tie-eschewing, VW Beetle-driving president has promised to cut Uruguay’s bloated public administration dramatically. He identifies with Brazil’s Lula and Chile’s Bachelet rather than Bolivia’s Morales or Venezuela’s Chávez. After 6% growth in 2010, Uruguay is expected to level at 4.4% in 2011.

With the unexpected death of her husband and her disastrous left-wing populist policies (inflation is close to 30%), Argentina’s Fernández is not expected to win reelection in 2011. Reading the writing on the wall, she (unlike Chávez) is tiptoeing toward the center.

In Colombia, the feared authoritarian tendencies of Alvaro Uribe turned out to be wildly exaggerated; and his successor, Juan Manuel Santos, has moved even closer to the center. The two — Santos was Minister of Defense under Uribe — brought the FARC insurgency to its knees, reducing the guerrillas to little more than extortionists and drug dealers. With Colombia’s new-found safety, high growth, and low inflation, its tourist industry is booming.

El Salvador, long the archetype of extreme polarization between the now-peaceful FMLN Marxist revolutionaries and the ex-paramilitary rightwing Arenas coalition, elected Mauricio Funes in 2009. Funes, the FMLN’s surprise candidate, ran on a centrist platform and has stuck to it — throwing the Arenas coalition into disarray. He enjoys a 79% approval rating, which makes him Latin America’s most popular leader. Neighboring Honduras, after deposing a power-grabbing Chávez clone in 2009, elected the center-right Pepe Lobo, who promised reconciliation and stability. Even Guatemala shows signs of progress. The 2007 elections inducted Álvaro Colom, the first center-left president in 53 years.

Latin American Marxism, unlike the European sort, has little to do with the industrial revolution or conditions of the working class.

Costa Rica, long Latin America’s exemplar of democracy and moderation, is becoming ever more so. The 2009 elections turned Laura Chinchilla into Costa Rica’s first female president (one even more stunningly beautiful than Argentina’s Fernández). In spite of being socially conservative, she continues Óscar Arias’ vaguely center-left policies. With the traditional center-right and center-left parties always closely vying for power, the libertarian Partido Movimiento Libertario (PML), which retains a 20% popular vote base (and 10% of the legislature), has emerged as the policy power broker in the Congress.

Latin American politics’ move to the center is even mirrored in its ancillaries. The Cuban American National Foundation, largest of the Cuban diaspora’s political representatives, abjured the use of force after the death of its founder, Mas Canosa, and advocates a more open US policy toward Cuba.

Not all is good news. Though Cuba is showing microscopic hints of change (as reported in Liberty’s December issue), Chávez’ power play in Venezuela after his electoral defeat is yet to play out, and Bolivia’s Evo Morales holds steady after a barely avoided civil war, Nicaragua’s anti-capitalist tyrant Daniel Ortega is bound and determined to hold onto power come what may. But their days, too, are numbered.




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Tourist Class

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Johnny Depp, my favorite actor to rave about, and Angelina Jolie, my favorite actress to rage against, together in the same film — how could I resist The Tourist? Despite its poor critical reviews, I had to see the film for myself.

The Tourist is an old-school spy thriller in the style of Alfred Hitchcock. Two strangers meet on a train. One is the cool and beautiful spy, Elise Clinton-Ward (Jolie). The other is Frank Tupelo (Depp), a hapless math teacher vacationing in Venice. Treasury agents are on the train, hoping she will lead them to her boyfriend, the mysterious Alexander. Elise needs to find a patsy to throw them off the trail. Frank fits the bill, and the game of cat-and-mouse begins. Add an international crime boss (Steven Berkoff) intent on regaining the money Alexander has stolen from him — a crime boss who also believes that Frank is Alexander — and the big dogs enter the chase.

Film buffs will recognize obvious allusions to Hitchcock's North by Northwest, including the famous cut to the overhead shot of the train barreling through the tunnel as Cary Grant and Eva Marie Saint discretely make love. The film is sprinkled with allusions to several other iconic films as well, including Star Wars and Indiana Jones. These allusions are subtle and fun, good for a knowing chuckle without becoming campy or distracting.

The Tourist is also blessed with a witty script, written by director Florian Henckel von Donnersmarck and Christopher McQuarrie. It contains several rapid-fire verbal exchanges worthy of a Word Watch column by Liberty's own Stephen Cox. One, involving the words "ravenous" and "ravishing," is hilarious, mainly because of Frank's deadpan sincerity. His continued use of Spanish tourist phrases as he tries to communicate with Italian hoteliers and policemen is equally humorous (and realistic). The plot itself has enough turns and twists to satisfy an audience of thrill seekers, and it keeps us guessing until the end. The supporting cast is fine too, especially Paul Bettany as the Treasury Inspector Acheson and Timothy Dalton as Inspector Jones.

So why is The Tourist being panned by most critics? There is that unfortunate casting decision — the selection of Angelina Jolie as the femme fatale. Even director Donnersmarck was unhappy with her selection, and left the project for a while after she was cast. Jolie is simply too cold and hard to play the role convincingly. Yes, Eva Marie Saint was cool and distant in North by Northwest, and it worked brilliantly. But she was a more versatile actress, and she played the role of Eve Kendall with intelligence and reserve. Her costumes — mostly smart suits topped by a sophisticated beehive hairstyle — emphasized a cool restraint that hinted at a hot passion simmering beneath the surface. The result was completely believable, and the scenes between Grant and Saint fairly sizzled with repressed desire.

Jolie, however, is the unwitting poster child for the age-old question: is it possible to be too rich or too thin? The answer, it seems, is Yes. She makes unintentional comedy as she tries, with her pencil-thin legs, to sashay down the street or through a room in a flowing silk dress while swaying her hips a la Marilyn Monroe. The trouble is, she has no hips to sway. To compensate for this problem, the costume designer added long ribbons to the back of each dress, apparently so there would be something to bounce. Nevertheless, the film contains several long scenes of heads turning as Elise skims through a restaurant, casino, or hotel lobby. One wonders, at times, whether this is a spy film or a perfume commercial.

There are some problems about Depp as well. His trademark quirkiness is intact, especially when he is running from the mobsters who think they are chasing Alexander. But his character’s ragged, cheek-length hairstyle emphasizes the fact that his face has rounded out with age, making him more reminiscent of an angsty Billy Crystal than the dashing Captain Jack Sparrow or debonair John Dillinger whom Depp has played in recent years. This may be good for his character as the timid and confused mathematics teacher, but not so good for viewers who look forward to seeing Depp's dashing good looks.

Several editing goofs also mar the film. For example, at one point Elise receives a hotel key inside a note card. When she uses the key, it has a thick red tassel attached, but when she received it, there was no tassel. Are we supposed to believe that she has spent the intervening moments shopping for a tassel and attaching it? Even more glaring is a mistake that happens when she drives a boat to take Frank to the airport. (This is in Venice, remember.) She is wearing a white sweater and dark slacks when she drops him off, but she has somehow changed into a gray knit dress when she drives away. Mistakes like this are very distracting, especially in a mystery thriller, where viewers are always on the lookout for clues.

The Tourist is an okay film, but it's a disappointment because it had the potential to be a great film. It will be worth watching on a long flight or when it comes to Showtime on TV, but it's unfortunately not worth the price of popcorn and admission.


Editor's Note: Review of "The Tourist," directed by Florian Henckel von Donnersmarck. Spyglass Entertainment, 2010, 103 minutes.



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The Government's "Green" Jobs

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Jonathan A. Lester, president of Continental Economics Inc., has written an insightful critique of artificial stimulus to wind power and the like (“Gresham’s Law of Green Energy,” in the Cato Institute’s journal Regulation, Winter 2010–2011, pp. 12–18). Like similar critiques, however, it could benefit from better placement of emphasis.

Lester laments the wasteful diversion of resources into uses that would otherwise not pay (waste, that is, barring untypically sound “externality” arguments). Furthermore, as for jobs created by subsidy- or regulation-based spending on green energy, the money so spent would have to come from somewhere. It would necessarily be diverted from spending on other public or private activities, where jobs otherwise created or maintained would be lost.

Such arguments put too much emphasis on spending itself relative to the allocation of real resources, including labor. Would the workers newly drawn into green jobs come from elsewhere, or would they have otherwise remained unemployed? Do green subsidies, tax breaks, and regulations really remedy economy-wide unemployment exceeding the frictional unemployment of normal times?

Unemployment in a recession reflects discoordination. Mutually advantageous transactions among workers, employers, and consumers are somehow frustrated. That is what needs attention. Putting emphasis on spending and its destinations is superficial. As W.H. Hutt used to say, spending is a measure of transactions accomplished; it is not what drives transactions.

Now, what impedes transactions in a recession? Usually or often it is a deficient quantity of money in relation to desires to hold it at the prevailing price and wage level. Sometimes (as now, apparently) the demand to hold money has increased, even if only passively or by default, because individuals and firms are especially uncertain about what transactions would be worthwhile. Adding to the usual uncertainty about business is uncertainty about taxation, government deficits and debt, complicated and costly regulations, and other government interventions, including unintended consequences of earlier ones.  This is what needs attention, not the allocation of spending between green and other employments.

Recession is not something to be remedied by shifting resources around. Besides channeling resources into relatively inefficient uses, artificially favoring green energy obscures the true nature of recession.




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When Pigs Fly

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There is an old adage in which I find considerable wisdom: “When a pig flies, you don’t criticize it for not staying up very long.” I take the meaning of this saying to be that when someone who has a habit of making poor choices finally makes a moderately good one, you ought to praise the success, even if you feel he could have done more.

Well, a pig has flown. President Obama, who for his first two years ran the most anti-free-trade administration since the days of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, has managed to salvage a free-trade agreement (FTA) with South Korea, after stalling it for two years and being snubbed in Asia when he tried to strongarm a new deal. He managed a minor renegotiation, getting some relief from Korea’s environmental regulations on our cars and a slowing of our phase-out of tariffs on the Koreans’ trucks. He did this, however, at the cost of keeping Korea’s tariffs on our cars in place for five more years, and of an extra two years of Korean tariffs on American pork products. Hardly worth the wait on a deal that was already well negotiated in 2007.

But the good news is that Obama will finally let the deal proceed, and that 95% of all US and South Korean tariffs will be eliminated within five years. The deal also opens up greater trade in services, allowing (for example) more Korean banks in America and more American banks in Korea. That’s all good.

Now that Speaker Pelosi is finally history, chances are good that Speaker Boehner (“Blubbering Boehner” to his chums) will get the FTA with Korea through the House — and also the FTAs with Colombia and Panama, which have been languishing on the sidelines since Bush left office. It would be helpful if the pig could stay aloft long enough to help get these deals past Congress. So far, Obama hasn’t bothered to do that. He has shown a touching deference to the unions that oppose them, and that gave so much to his presidential campaign.

Yet it seems to be dawning on the exceptionally obtuse Obama that it may be far more useful to his 2012 reelection (gag!) campaign to have lower unemployment than to have higher union contributions poured into his campaign coffers. Perhaps the pig isn’t just flying; perhaps he has had an epiphany.

If for that we are hardly ecstatic, we can at least be satisfied.




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Finding a Voice

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Robert Frost defined poetry as “a lump in the throat; a homesickness or a love-sickness . . . where an emotion has found its thought and the thought has found the words.”

Just as a poem can express an emotion or describe a relationship through a single snapshot, sometimes a person’s character can be summed up in a single experience. For King George VI (“Bertie,” as he was called by his family) that experience occurred in his determined effort to overcome a pronounced lifelong stammer. The King’s Speech is a wonderfully witty, brilliantly acted, and emotionally satisfying film that tells of the singular moment when an unorthodox speech therapist (Geoffrey Rush) helped the king (Colin Firth) to find his voice, at a time when England — and the free world — desperately needed it.

One of the unexpected pleasures of this film is the opportunity to see the royal family in their living rooms, so to speak, when they were young and not expecting to become king or queen. A rumble of recognition is heard in the theater, for example, as viewers realize with a start that Helena Bonham Carter’s character is the young Queen Mum, already demonstrating her twinkling smile and munching on the marshmallows that would eventually lead to her familiar round torso. “That’s Queen Elizabeth!” at least one viewer gasped as the young princess, Elizabeth (Freya Wilson) is seen romping in pink pajamas with her little sister Margaret (Ramona Marquez) as they listen eagerly to a bedtime story told by their father, the man who did not expect to be king.

It is also unexpectedly intimate to see the debonair playboy Prince of Wales cum King Edward VIII cum Duke of Windsor (Guy Pearce), bursting into tears and sobbing on the shoulder of his mother, Queen Mary (Claire Bloom), at the death of his father George V (Michael Gambon) — sobbing not because his father has died but because of what it will mean to his relationship with the twice (and still) married Wallis Simpson (Eve Best). He would remain king for less than a year, not even enough time for his official coronation, induced to abdicate because of the relationship with Mrs. Simpson and because of his general incompetence.

George VI was a great example of courage, confidence, and commitment during World War II, not only in his speeches but also in his actions.

As the film opens, Bertie, the timid younger son of a domineering father, attempts to stammer his way through a radio speech under the disapproving eye of King George V, whose Christmas radio speeches were as important to his people’s sense of good will as Roosevelt’s Fireside Chats became in America. The film suggests that George V’s raging disapproval and faultfinding may have contributed to Bertie’s stammer.

Sitting behind him and stoically willing him to succeed, his wife Elizabeth (Bonham Carter) exudes tender disappointment when he fails. She is not embarrassed by him; she hurts for him. Several royal doctors try to cure Bertie of his awkward and unregal stammer, but to no avail. In one particularly ironic scene, a doctor urges him to smoke cigarettes frequently because it will “relax” his vocal cords. (Sadly, George VI would die of lung cancer and arteriosclerosis at the age of 56.) Eventually Elizabeth finds an unconventional therapist, Lionel Logue (Rush), who changes Bertie’s life by restoring his voice, and by becoming his lifelong friend.

The film is a delightful mixture of royal protocol and unexpected earthiness. Logue refuses to treat the Duke of York any differently from the way in which he treats his other clients, even insisting that they use first names. Their banter is droll and often hilarious. When Myrtle Logue (Jennifer Ehle), who is unaware of her husband’s famous client, comes home a bit early to find the king and queen of England standing in her parlor, she asks querulously, “Will their Majesties be staying for dinner?” Elizabeth, knowing it would be inappropriate for them to stay, responds charmingly, “We would love to. Such a treat! But alas . . . a previous engagement. What a pity.” No wonder everyone loved the Queen Mum!

The King’s Speech is a tour de force for Colin Firth and Geoffrey Rush, two masters of the king’s English, who spar and vie for dominance in each scene. But despite the humor there is an underlying seriousness to Bertie’s effort to overcome his impediment, especially when his struggles are set against the backdrop of his older brother’s abdication and the run-up to World War II. One of the most brilliant scenes in the film is King George VI’s 1939 Christmas speech to the British people, on the eve of the war with Germany. The speech is familiar to anyone who has studied that period of history. It has always seemed emotionally charged and solemn because of its halting delivery. Learning that this delivery was the result of a speech impediment does not lessen its gravity. Instead, it increases it, as it demonstrates the king’s strength and courage at a time when the British people would be called upon to demonstrate strength and courage of their own. Logue literally conducts the king in his delivery of the speech in the way a maestro would conduct an orchestra, virtually transforming it into a lyric, set to the solemn strains of Beethoven’s Seventh Symphony, which fills the theater throughout the scene.

George VI was a great example of courage, confidence, and commitment during World War II, not only in his speeches but also in his actions. When Buckingham Palace was bombed and his advisors urged him to move his family to the safety of Canada for the duration of the war, the king refused, joining Londoners in underground air raid shelters. While his people sent their children to the safety of the English countryside, the princesses Elizabeth and Margaret stayed in town.

Meanwhile, the abdicated Edward VIII and his beloved Wallis Warfield Simpson led an unhappy life. Suspected of German sympathies, they met with Hitler before the war, and he was finally sent by Churchill to govern the Bahamas, mainly to keep him out of the way. Hitler himself was quoted as saying, "I am certain through him permanent friendly relations could have been achieved. If he had stayed, everything would have been different. His abdication was a severe loss for us." One has to wonder where England might have stood during World War II — and what Europe would be like today — if Wallis Simpson hadn’t stolen Edward’s heart and caused him to give up the throne.


Editor's Note: Review of "The King’s Speech," directed by Tom Hooper. See-Saw Films/The Weinstein Co., 2010, 118 minutes.



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The New Landscape of Libertarianism

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New York magazine published an article called “The Trouble With Liberty” in its January 3–10, 2011 issue. I was intrigued by a line on the magazine’s cover. It asked, “Are we all libertarians now?” And what I found in the essay was very interesting.

The author, Christopher Beam, presents a brief yet wide history of libertarianism, ranging from Ron and Rand Paul and Paul Ryan to David Boaz to Ayn Rand and Friedrich Hayek. Beam explains that libertarianism has elements from both the Right and the Left and does not fit easily into either mode, and he outlines the various attempts to promote a libertarian country — from those that would enlist the Republican Party or the Libertarian Party, to Brink Lindsey’s Liberaltarianism, to the Free State Project and the Seasteading Institute.

Beam pegs libertarians as crazy old uncles or Dungeons & Dragons players, but his history of libertarianism is quite complimentary. He says that the Founding Fathers and the Constitution were actually more libertarian than anything else. The gist of the essay is that with the Tea Party movement and the rise of Rand Paul and Paul Ryan, libertarianism is on the rise and our moment has come.

But halfway through, Mr. Beam changes his tone and gets to the heart of his essay, which is a critique of libertarianism and an explanation of why he thinks it is a bad policy for the United States. His arguments aren’t theoretically sophisticated and are designed to appeal to a mass audience: if there are poor people, and charity can’t provide for them, then we need welfare or else they will steal from us; we need public education in case the free market can’t educate everyone; we need a central bank in order to print a uniform currency. He mentions “asymmetrical information” and “public goods,” and argues that if the bailout had not happened then innocent investors and homeowners who innocently misunderstood the riskiness of their loans would have been punished. “There’s always a tension between freedom and fairness,” he says, and we libertarians “pretend the tension doesn’t exist.”

We must shift the alignment of America’s political discourse so that socialism no longer sounds like common sense, and our proposals seem like the new common sense.

Libertarianism can never succeed, he claims, because politicians must compromise and libertarians refuse to compromise or cooperate. One of the overarching criticisms in the essay, and perhaps its most obnoxious, is the subtle implication that libertarians have such a hard time accomplishing real change because we know that our theories are mere impractical abstractions unsuitable for pragmatic flesh-and-blood reality, so we would be revealed as idiots if we ever achieved political power.

The refutations of Beam’s arguments are so obvious that I need not detail them. What is more significant is the mere existence of his essay. It is, in my opinion, one of the early post-Tea Party attempts by the Left to come up with an ideological response to people with open minds from taking libertarianism seriously. I strongly doubt that libertarianism has reached the peak of its popularity, but what this essay signals to me is that people who ten or twenty years ago might never have known what libertarianism is are now hearing the word “libertarianism” and asking what it means. Beam provides a leftist answer to that question. But he also cites surveys showing that more people now define themselves as libertarians than ever before, and that this poses a threat to the liberal-conservative establishment.

If the Tea Party phenomenon grows and Rand Paul’s career continues, we should expect to see many more such essays. I think that they will all follow Beam’s pattern. “The Trouble With Liberty” shows what two challenges we must overcome in order to be taken seriously.

First, there is something, call it “common sense” or the “social imagination” or whatever, but there is a set of simple political ideas that, whether true or false, permeates a culture. We need to introduce arguments into the American intellectual culture to refute the “common sense” arguments for statism, such as the argument that we need a welfare state to rescue the poor. We must shift the alignment of America’s political discourse so that socialism no longer sounds like common sense, and our proposals, which Beam skewers as extremist, seem like the new common sense. This is similar to what Glenn Beck claims the socialists did to us with the Overton Window – shifting cultural common sense by gradually introducing extreme ideas until they become mainstream  — but it works in reverse.

Second, we must prove that libertarianism can work in practice as well as in theory, and we must call upon our libertarian politicians to show the American people that it is possible to have noble ideals while still being pragmatic and getting things done. In my opinion the danger is not that Rand Paul and Paul Ryan will make too many compromises; it is the opposite: they will be too idealistic and take an all-or-nothing approach to change, and thus will be unable to work with their Republican colleagues. In that way, they will confirm the fears that Beam would like to promote.

“Libertarianism is still considered the crazy uncle of American politics,” Beam writes. It is only natural for the liberal-conservative establishment to oppose us by laughing at us so loudly that nobody will take us seriously. That is, after all, right out of Ellsworth Toohey’s playbook. The question is how we will respond to the laughter — by behaving like weird extremists and impractical idealists, or by showing that we deserve to be taken seriously and that our abstract theories really will work in practical reality.




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Not Gittin' Outta Gitmo

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One has to think that the libertarian Obamanistas — libertarians who supported Obama, thinking that he couldn’t spend more money than the Republicans, and would at least end the war on terror and dramatically reduce the military posture of the country, must feel some uncertainty about their guy.

Certainly, in terms of spending and deficits, he makes Bush look like a fiscal hawk. In his two years in office, Obama’s yearly deficits have been over four times the size of Bush’s largest. And in terms of state control of the economy — the socialization of the medical system, the nationalization of the auto industries, the massive increase in regulations, the dramatic increase in the size of the federal bureaucracy, and the expansion of environmentalist hegemony over natural resources — he has explored a whole New Frontier of statist economics.

As to the war on terror, he hasn’t ended it, or even diminished it appreciably, much less brought in a new era of isolationism. We are still in Iraq — though scheduled to exit, but no earlier than Bush’s plans called for — and are fairly well stuck in Afghanistan. Virtually all of Bush’s executive orders on the war on terror remain essentially unchanged.

A recent Reuters report (Jan. 7) underscores this point. While Obama was in the Senate, then on the campaign trail, then during his first two years in office, he relentlessly bashed Bush for holding prisoners outside the regular court system, detained at the Guantanamo Bay prison. Obama promised to give the Gitmo detainees fair trials in our regular court system, though he also promised they would all be convicted and jailed — well, indefinitely!

But quietly, on a Friday when news coverage is guaranteed to be minimal, Obama signed a law that prohibits bringing the remaining 175 Gitmo prisoners here for court trials.

He said he had no choice but to sign the bill — the defense authorization act for fiscal 2011 — because the military funding was necessary, even though the bill contained that provision banning domestic civilian trials for the terrorist detainees. And he vowed to fight to get the provision repealed — although the ban was put in the bill by one of the most left-wing Congresses in American industry, so it is hard to see why he thinks he can get it through a more right-wing Congress.

Obama’s claim that he had to sign the bill is just a lie. He certainly could have vetoed it and made it clear to Congress that he would not sign any future bill that included the provision. But he didn’t, and this raises a dilemma about him.

Perhaps he still wants to give the Gitmo guys domestic civilian trials, and has merely decided that trying those prisoners here would be too politically costly. Certainly, the public opposes such trials by a large margin. But if that is the case, he is not much of a man of principle.

On the other hand, perhaps he has changed his mind on the matter, and no longer views such trials as worthwhile. After all, the showpiece of the Obama policy of domestic civil trials for terrorists was the trial of Ahmed Ghailani, the Gitmo guy who was involved in the 1998 bombings of US embassies. The trial ended late last year with the jury finding Ghailani not guilty on 279 of the 280 counts Obama’s Justice Department brought against him, finding him guilty on only one count: planning to destroy US property. He was not found guilty of even one of the 224 murder counts against him. Hardly bracing for the prospect of keeping the other Gitmo guys safely away from society.

However, if Obama has changed his mind, what does that say about his judgment — compared to, say, George Bush’s?




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The Serious and the Buffoons

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I like to congratulate countries that, unlike ours, take energy policy seriously. Serious energy policy simply means that you seriously try to find and exploit new energy sources, using reality-based rather than delusional thinking.

Our present administration, which cherishes the delusion that noisy, ugly, and inefficient windmill farms and costly, ugly, and inefficient solar panel farms will allow us to dispense with oil, gas, and coal, is the paradigm case of unserious (i.e., joke) policy makers.

For being serious, kudos should go to Israel. As noted by the Wall Street Journal on Dec. 30, it has encouraged extensive exploration for fossil fuels off its shoreline, and the search has paid off prodigiously. The most recent discovery may tip the Mideast balance of power in Israel’s favor. A huge field of natural gas, aptly called Leviathan, apparently contains 16 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (according to Noble Energy, the American firm developing it). That field alone could supply Israel’s gas needs for a century. It might even make Israel a net energy exporting country.

Leviathan was found in the vicinity of smaller fields discovered earlier in the Levant Basin, an area of Mediterranean seabed off the coasts of Israel and Lebanon. The first two fields, Noa and Mari, discovered in 1999 and 2000 respectively, together contain about 11 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The Tamar and Dalit fields, both discovered in early 2009, together contain about 9 trillion cubic feet.

The US Geological Survey estimates that the Levant Basin holds a total of 122 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, not to mention 1.7 billion barrels of oil. To put that in perspective, the Levant Basin’s estimated gas reserves are nearly half of what America’s entire natural gas reserves are thought to be.

These huge fields, together with Israel’s laws favoring energy exploration and development, caused the Israeli energy sector stock index to soar 1,700% in 2010. They also led to Lebanon’s passing laws to develop its share of the Levant Basin.

A second story appeared in the Journal on Dec. 31. It reports that even as our unemployment rate hovers near 10% and the price of gasoline continues to rise, the harlequins in the Obama administration have issued a directive sealing off even more lands from productive exploration. This directive requires the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to search its huge holdings to find “unspoiled” back country that it can then decree to be “wild lands” and lock away from development of any kind.

This may block from use many millions of acres of land in Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, and everyplace else where the feds own land. (The BLM supervises 250 million acres of land!) You can just forget about the uranium, oil, natural gas, and other valuable resources of the areas the BLM shuts down.

The BLM used this power freely back in the 1970s and 1980s, but in 2003, after a lawsuit from the government of Utah, it relinquished the power. Now Obama, having lost his legislative power, is trying to build up the executive power necessary to carry out his jihad against carbon energy, and reverse the 2003 decision. He seems to think that shortages of — and high prices for — energy are the keys to economic prosperity.

All this inclines me to say “Mazel tov!” to the Israelis, and “Go to hell!” to the Obamanista environmental extremists, who are trying to choke off this nation’s energy.




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The Dangers of Diagnosis

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“Nearly 1 in 5 Americans had mental illness in 2009.” This recent CNBC online headline captured my attention.

The brief article that followed was based on a report by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, a federal agency (oas.samhsa.gov). The article repeats highlights from the agency’s report entitled “Results from the 2009 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Mental Health Findings,” available in PDF form.

The article states that an estimated 45 million US residents had a mental illness, and 11 million had a serious mental illness, and that these numbers reflect increasing depression among the unemployed.

The article’s intention — to create alarm — is loosely veiled. If people do not have access to interventionist and preventive treatment, any number of woes can follow: “disability, substance abuse, suicide, lost productivity and family discord.” Lost employment equals lost health insurance equals a lack of access to treatment equals a crisis. The insinuation is that government should step in to close the treatment gap.

Finding this article was fortuitous. Only days before I had read an article in Skeptic magazine about the “foibles of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual V” — the diagnostic guide for mental health practitioners. (For details, see “Prognosis Negative” in Skeptic, volume 15, number 3 [2010], by John Sorboro, himself a licensed, practicing psychiatrist.)

The state of the psychiatric arts today, complicated by increased government control over our nation’s healthcare industry, should alarm all citizens, not just libertarians.

According to Dr. Sorboro, the upcoming version of the DSM will have a marked increase in diagnosable psychiatric disorders, which may include “compulsive shopping” and “Post Traumatic Embitterment Disorder.” But the problem with the DSM has to do with the validity of what it says.

To rectify the unscientific nature of prior versions of the work, the third version was intended to “increase reliability by standardizing definitions.” Still, critics maintained that “the rhetoric of science — rather than scientific data — was used by the developers of the DSM-III to promote their goal, and science did not support [their] claims.” In 1994, the DSM-IV was published, listing 297 disorders. The latest revision is set to increase that list. Yet according to Dr. Sorboro, almost “every major psychiatric construct is seen as being of questionable validity by a vocal group within the field itself[,] or outside it.”

Psychiatric disorders are supposed to be pathological constructs, as Parkinson’s disease is a pathological construct. For a construct to be valid, Sorboro states, it must differentiate itself from other pathological constructs and provide a theoretical framework for prediction and specific intervention. He likens psychiatric pathological constructs to the construct for fibromyalgia — “a loose collection of non-specific complaints.” Fibromyalgia lacks an underlying, identifiable pathology. So do psychiatric constructs.

Critiques of the DSM include claims that it’s a collection of “the moral objections of a group within power [who] desire to medically pathologize another group for self serving purposes,” and that it is “a-theoretical and purely descriptive.” Evidence in support of the former critique is that homosexuality was not entirely removed from the DSM’s list of mental disorders until the latter half of the 1980s!

A diagnosis based on the DSM is not a divination of pathology. The DSM is tautological. It describes. It does not explain. Thus, diagnosis is subjective, not objective. Sorboro uses bipolar disorders to illustrate. Bipolar I disorder appeared in the DSM-III in 1980, followed by Bipolar II Disorder, Bipolar Disorder NOS (not otherwise specified — that’s worrisome), and cyclothymia. There has been a correlative rise in the diagnoses of such disorders — one statistic that Sorboro cites is a 4000% increase in bipolar disorder diagnoses in children during the past decade, despite the fact that mental health practitioners know “hardly anything more of real scientific significance about bipolar disorder than we did in 1980.”

Soboro states that medical disease classification evolves in a messy and inconsistent way, “and often has to do with politics and not just compelling scientific fact. It’s just much worse in psychiatry.” For example, contributors to the DSM-V include “health care consumers”; and as Sorboro says, no other branch of medicine would ask consumers for advice in defining pathology. Moreover, the American Psychiatric Association taskforce handling this revision is conspicuously closed and non-transparent — task force members must sign confidentiality agreements and cannot keep written notes of their meetings.

Hmm.

I have been skeptical of the DSM since I first read it. I was a judicial clerk, and my judge kept a copy of the DSM-IV on one of his bookshelves. He used it for reference during sentencing hearings and when he presided over mental health hearings. During lulls in my clerkship tasks, I read several large chunks of the DSM-IV. My initial thoughts were: there certainly are some people with severe mental problems, but this is bullshit. Symptoms of the indicated mental “conditions” were so encompassing that anyone and everyone could be classified as having some type of mental disorder.

My best friend from high school is a psychiatrist, and after reading the DSM-IV, I asked her about it. She said that it gives a practitioner guidelines for diagnoses. But don’t guidelines have to guide? I asked. Isn't a diagnostic process that has no conceptual limits wholly subjective? The flu is marked by symptoms that make it the flu and not a common cold or pneumonia. But even a brief reading of the DSM shows that mental illnesses are not marked by unique symptoms. Why? My friend had a few forgettable justifications, but no answers.

Homosexuality was not entirely removed from the DSM’s list of mental disorders until the latter half of the 1980s!

Many Liberty readers are familiar with libertarian criticisms of the mental health industry. But the state of the psychiatric arts today, complicated by increased government control over our nation’s healthcare industry, should alarm all citizens, not just libertarians. Psychiatric abuse by states against citizens is well documented; psychiatric imprisonment for dissidents in the Soviet Union is just one example.

The dangers are clear. In the legal realm, when a criminal statute is overbroad, behavior otherwise constitutionally protected is criminalized, subjecting more citizens to state control. Overdiagnosis of overinclusive mental disorders will subject more citizens to treatment — which, under Obamacare, means subjection to more government control. This should be enough to give anyone an anxiety disorder. Considering the political nature of mental “disease” classification, I wonder if a disorder marked by “irrational fear” of a “benevolent government” might be among the disorders included in the new DSM.




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