Buying Genocide

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“Socialists always run out of other people’s money. It’s quite characteristic of them.”       
—Baroness Thatcher

How are totalitarian regimes able to control the populace and gain its support for even the vilest programs?

In an earlier piece, I suggested that there are three basic methods employed by compliance agents — the people who try to get a targeted group to comply with their wishes — to get what they want. These I termed power, purchase, and persuasion.

The Tools of Compliance

By power I mean force, threat of force, or theft. Of course, the attempt at force may not succeed, if the agent has insufficient strength to overpower — or insufficient guile to successfully steal from — the target.

By purchase I mean trading something that the agent and the target both value — money, labor, physical objects. Again, the attempt may fail — the agent may not have enough of what the target values to pay the target’s price, or they may be unable to agree upon a price. By persuasion (or promotion), I mean offering reasons (other than threats of force or attempted bargaining) to the target. If Fred’s doctor urges Fred to stop smoking or face an increased chance of cancer, the doctor is not threatening Fred — after all, the doctor won’t inflict the cancer on Fred; the cigarettes will.[1] Nor is the doctor bargaining with Fred. He is “arguing from consequences”; that is, he is arguing that Fred’s behavior will objectively hurt Fred, so Fred ought to stop that behavior. Even if Fred’s doctor chose not to argue rationally but decided to manipulate Fred emotionally — say, by showing Fred pictures of his kids crying out “Daddy, please don’t die!” — the doctor is neither threatening nor bargaining.

For one thing, it exonerates the rest of the world for its complicity in the Holocaust, and allows us all to sigh in relief that “it could never happen here.”

An interesting point from cognitive psychology that I’ve heard Matt Ridley[2] make is that while nonhuman animals often use force and theft to get what they want from other animals, they don’t, strictly speaking, trade with others, in the sense of giving something they value to get something they value more. As Adam Smith put it, “Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for another with another dog.”[3] Applying the point about persuasion to animals: I have never seen a dog offer an argument to get another dog to do something — though a dog does seem to know how to appear or sound pitiable to its owners when it wants something.

Of course, power, purchase, and persuasion are not perfectly distinct categories, as I noted earlier. But they allow us to pursue an interesting discussion — one going back for seven decades in the search for explanations of Nazi totalitarianism. A critical review of this discussion, especially as it appears in a number of distinguished works of the 21st century, provides a framework in which key concepts and controversies can be seen.

The Goldhagen Dispute: Why Did Germans Support the Nazi regime?

Let’s start with an insightful paper by Alexander Groth, called “Demonizing the Germans.” In this paper, the estimable Professor Groth — himself a Holocaust survivor — takes up the issue of the culpability of the German public for the crimes of the Nazis. He reviews two books: Daniel Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (1996) and Robert Gellately’s Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany (2001). Both these books, Groth says, put forward the view that Hitler’s policies during the 12 years of his regime were based on the “spontaneous preferences” of the German public, not the regime’s “coercion and manipulation.” the regime’s use of the power delivered by its police state and the persuasion delivered by its propaganda machine (118).

Groth concedes that the regime’s policies required the collusion and cooperation of millions of Germans. But he criticizes the authors for pushing their cases beyond logic and evidence. Indeed, Groth holds that Goldhagen’s view of Germans is “almost racist in its sweeping character” (119). He takes Goldhagen to mean that “the Germans let Hitler and his minions, soldiers, policemen, and bureaucrats, kill the Jews because they fundamentally agreed with Hitler that this was a good idea” (119).

While the average German said nothing about the Nazi destruction of the Jews, neither did FDR or Churchill, even though the latter were far freer to speak out.

Groth has many problems with this view. For one thing, it exonerates the rest of the world for its complicity in the Holocaust, and allows us all to sigh in relief that “it could never happen here.” And he points to a logical gap. Everyone, Goldhagen included, recognizes that the Germans involved in the execution of the Holocaust — the men involved in designing the scheme, arresting and transporting the victims, and running the death camps — could at most amount to 5% of the population of 80 million. The other Germans, while not active, did nothing to stop the killings, but passively accepted them. But Groth points out that while the rest of the Germans did not publicly mourn or protest the mass murder of the Jews, the most reasonable conclusion from that absence of protest would be that they just didn’t care, not that they supported it. I would sharpen the point by adding that while there were no massive protests against the Final Solution, there were no massive rallies in support of it either.

Here Groth rightly notes that Goldhagen fails to distinguish among the German non-genocidaires:

. . . those who could not care less; those who rejoiced in Hitler’s policies; those who were appalled by those policies but feared the risks of speaking out; those who had a variety of doubts and reservations about Hitler’s treatment of the Jews but who also were not willing to jeopardize their lives, their careers, and their families to voice them; and, finally, the many Germans confused and misled by Nazi propaganda and information controls. After all, the Nazis never admitted publicly that they were exterminating the Jews. They were just resettling them in the East. (120)

And Groth adds to this point the observation that while the average German said nothing about the Nazi destruction of the Jews, neither did FDR or Churchill, even though the latter were far freer to speak out, far more informed, and far more protected from reprisals. Were FDR and Churchill “eliminationist anti-Semites” as well?[4]

Groth also criticizes Goldhagen’s claim that the vitriolic German anti-Semitic literature of the 19th and early 20th centuries was unmatched in Europe or elsewhere. Groth observes that Goldhagen adduces no evidence for this claim, and mentions similar anti-Semitic literature in Poland and Rumania. (I will suggest later in this piece that Groth is overlooking something about German anti-Semitism that was unique.)

To Goldhagen’s point that whatever anti-Semitism existed elsewhere in Europe, it was only in Germany that an openly anti-Semitic party was elected to power, Groth replies by noting that in the three Reichstag elections prior to April 1933, the Nazis received only 37%, 33%, and 44% — that last vote coming with the full aid of SA thugs in the streets, intimidating voters. Furthermore, while Hitler’s anti-Semitism is blatant in Mein Kampf, how many voters had read the book? How many dismissed much of it as exaggerated? How many who shared the Nazi antipathy towards Jews favored not merely mass murder, but, say, encouraging Jews to convert to Christianity or emigrate? Remember: from 1933 until the outset of the war or later, the Nazis focused on pressuring Jews to leave. Groth rightly notes that there were no exit polls at the time, so we cannot say why those who voted Nazi did so. Moreover, Theodore Abel’s sociological study of essays by 600 Nazi Party members in the period shortly after Hitler achieved power, describing why they joined the party, showed that only about 36% stated anti-Semitic motives.

From 1871 (when Germany unified) to 1933, Jews were far better off in Germany than in Eastern Europe by any measure — and there were no pogroms in Germany.

Groth cites two scholars in support of his view. First he quotes Sarah Gordon[5] saying that even among Party members, there was considerable diversity of opinion on the “Jewish question,” and only a “small percentage” shared Hitler’s “paranoid” anti-Semitism. She claims that more Germans disapproved of Hitler’s anti-Jewish policies than supported them. And, she adds, Hitler’s central role in the Holocaust should never be underestimated. She further points out that Germans faced a (minimum) of two years in a concentration camp for aiding Jews or publicly supporting their cause — a fate much worse than regular jail.

Groth then quotes William Sheridan Allen,[6] who focused his research on the Nazi takeover of the town of Thalburg. Allen reported that most of the townspeople were relatively unsympathetic to the anti-Semitism of the Nazi ideology. Jews at all class levels were well integrated into the town’s society. Though there was “abstract” anti-Semitism — a general dislike of Jewishness that showed up in jokes or expressions of distaste, many people just ignored the anti-Semitic aspect of the Party when voting for it. Indeed, “Thalburgers were drawn to anti-Semitism because they were drawn to Nazism, not the other way around” (127).

And Groth quotes from Saul Friedlander[7] the idea that during the 1930s the German population didn’t demand anti-Jewish measures; in fact, those who supported eliminationist anti-Semitism were only a segment of the Party.

Groth next makes the point that if there were a native German eliminationist anti-Semitism, why didn’t it show up prior to 1933? Indeed, from 1871 (when Germany unified) to 1933, Jews were far better off in Germany than in Eastern Europe by any measure — access to education, participation in social and political institutions, or rate of intermarriage — and there were no pogroms in Germany as there were in Russia and Eastern Europe.

He also cites a survey of 500 German POWs done in 1944. Among men below 30, 33% said anti-Semitism was “helpful” to Germany, while 44% said it was “harmful.” Among men over 30, only 17% agreed it was “helpful” while 60% saw it as “harmful.” (Twenty-three percent of both groups did not reply to the question.) And he notes that when the violence started, be it Kristallnacht in 1938 or the killing camps and Einsatzgruppen later, it was the police, the SS, the SA, and (less often) the regular military who did the killing, not “frenzied, out-of-control German civilian mobs” (130).

Even if the primarily responsibility for the Holocaust lies with the leadership, the question of popular support still remains.

Groth adds that post-WWII, while Germany has seen some Skinhead and neo-Nazi groups, there has been no mass violence against the Jews, but only “scattered” attacks against synagogues, Jewish cemeteries, and individual Jews. And political parties espousing anti-Semitism have done poorly in German elections.

Here are some points to ponder.

Regarding the Abel analysis of 600 essays about why Party members joined the NSDAP: the fact that only 36% said they were anti-Semitic doesn’t mean that the rest weren’t. If you surveyed Republicans and asked why they are in the party, perhaps two-thirds would neglect to mention “lower taxes.” But if you explicitly asked whether they favored lower taxes, probably 98% would say yes. Similarly, if you asked Democrats why they support the party perhaps two-thirds would not mention increasing taxes on the rich. But if you asked whether they favored that policy, again, probably 98% would say they did.

Regarding Sarah Gordon, to the effect that few Germans were paranoid anti-Semites of “Hitler’s ilk”: Gordon seems as data-light as Goldhagen. What Groth might have looked at is data on attendance at the Nazi anti-Semitic movies. For example, Jud Süss (1940), which pushed the most extreme anti-Semitism, was the sixth most popular film made during the Third Reich. 20.3 million Germans paid for tickets, about 40% of the adults in greater Germany. Compare the big Spielberg hit, Saving Private Ryan (1998), which was seen by about 20% of American adults at the time, and you see how attractive the anti-Semitic film was.

Regarding Groth’s and Gordon’s point that Hitler played a “central role” in the Holocaust: just why did Hitler and his myrmidons favor extermination of the Jews (at seemingly great cost towards the end of the war)? Was it just, say, schizophrenic paranoia? Was Hitler ever diagnosed as a paranoid, or hospitalized for psychotic symptoms? Or was it a deep ideological conviction, and, if so, why? Even if the primarily responsibility for the Holocaust lies with the leadership, the question of popular support still remains.

Regarding Groth’s point — a completely obvious one — that prior to Hitler coming to power, Germany historically had higher levels of integration of Jews into society, and no pogroms: perhaps the German government (for various reasons) did not allow pogroms, whereas the Tsarist government allowed (and even facilitated) them. And Jews were as well integrated in most of the rest of Western Europe (especially England, which had elected a Jew as Prime Minister as early as 1868), and suffered no pogroms either — but only Germany ever freely elected (by a strong plurality) an openly and deeply anti-Semitic party.

The SS, SA and police were formed from civilian volunteers. And the populace often cooperated with the Gestapo and other police agencies, and did nothing to impede the mass atrocities.

Regarding Groth’s citation (following Gordon) of the survey of 500 German POWs in 1944: the sample size is small (the margin of error is 5%), and its randomness is questionable — maybe German soldiers with attitudes more sympathetic to the Allies surrendered to them more readily. Worse, there is an obvious problem with interviewer error. The Germans were exposing their feelings to — their captors, who the POWs knew were profoundly anti-Nazi. Did those POWs feel free to answer honestly? We need to remember the classic illustration cited by Darrel Huff.[8] During WWII, Gallup interviewed African Americans as to whether they thought they would be treated worse by society if the Japanese won the war, and found that nearly double the number answered in the negative when the interviewer was black compared to those asked by a white interviewer.

Regarding Groth’s point that the actual killers — the genocidaires — of Jews were not civilians, but members of the SS, SA, regular police, and elements of the regular military: the SS, SA and police were formed from civilian volunteers. (The SA and SS had their origins in the Freikorps, organized militias that fought revolutionaries in the German streets after WWI.) And again, the populace often cooperated with the Gestapo and other police agencies, and did nothing to impede the mass atrocities.

Finally, regarding Groth’s point that after the 1940s, while Germany has seen skinheads and neo-Nazis, and occasionally attacks on Jewish cemeteries, synagogues, and individuals, there have been no governmental attacks: this is a weak point indeed. By the end of WWII most of Germany had been devastated, with millions of its civilians killed; the world came to know the extent of the Holocaust and condemned Germany accordingly, and the county was dismembered and occupied for decades. Of course even the most devout anti-Semites would be deterred from repeating their crimes. Moreover, post-WWII Germany was virtually devoid of Jewish citizens — even now, at about 120,000, there would be few left for modern eliminationist anti-Semites to eliminate.

In sum, while Groth offers some good criticisms of Goldhagen, they are in my view hardly definitive.

I turn now to Groth’s views on Robert Gellately’s work. Groth accuses Gellately of a flawed analysis of the data and a “lack of familiarity with the literature of totalitarianism.” This seems harsh, especially considering that both Gellately’s books were published not though some obscure press, but through Oxford University Press. But let us consider the rival contentions.

The Gestapo’s power was based not so much on its numbers as on its power to disrupt citizens’ lives, its arbitrary operations, its lack of public accountability, its exemption from the rule of law, and its known tendency to torture and murder freely.

Gellately argued in an early book[9] that the Gestapo was in fact “a terribly undermanned institution, incapable of policing German society on its own,” so it relied heavily on informants (Groth 131).

To this, Groth makes some cogent replies. The first is more of a dig: if contemporary American students and faculty report feeling intimidated on college campuses by political correctness, it is strange to think that the Germans would not have feared the Gestapo. Moreover, the Gestapo’s power was based not so much on its numbers as on its power to disrupt citizens’ lives, its arbitrary operations, its lack of public accountability, its exemption from the rule of law, and its known tendency to torture and murder freely.

Moreover, the Gestapo was interconnected with the SS, a very large organization — Groth doesn’t mention it, but the SS at its peak numbered 850,000, which is roughly the number of all local police in the contemporary US, a nation about four times the population of Nazi Germany. And the Gestapo worked in secret. So even if it had relatively few agents, the public could have no clue about that, or about the number of Gestapo informants among the public.

Groth is correct about the power of the German police state, and that will be the focus of the third in this series of essays for this journal. But he is on shakier ground when he critiques Gellately’s more recent book, Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany.[10] Gellately asks why the German people almost uniformly followed Hitler from 1933 to the bitter end in 1945. Groth notes that while Gellately acknowledges the role of the Nazi propaganda machine, its strict control of communication (read: its silencing of all opposition), and its institutions of coercion and terror, Gellately concludes that the Nazi regime rested mainly on consensus. And this Groth does not accept.

By the outbreak of the war, the Nazi form of anti-Semitism had taken hold.

Gellately argues that besides using coercion and propaganda, Hitler was much more interested in getting and keeping popular support. So, unlike his rival Stalin, Hitler did not target large parts of his country’s population, confining his police state apparatus to the regime’s enemies and its targeted minorities. The regime sought popular backing until the very end of its existence. And Gellately adds that “many Germans went along, not because they were mindless robots, but because they convinced themselves of Hitler’s advantages and the ‘positive’ side of the new dictatorship” (136).

Furthermore, as Gellately points out, certainly from 1933 to 1939, the regime could show apparent successes in reclaiming lost territory, dramatically lowering unemployment, making more consumer goods available, and building out infrastructure. Gellately points to the rise in Nazi Party membership from about 130,000 in 1930 to 850,000 in 1933, and the SA’s growth from 77,000 in 1931 to 3 million in 1934. In the 1932 and 1933 plebiscites, the Nazis won the plurality of the vote. Gellately further argues that by the outbreak of the war, the Nazi form of anti-Semitism had taken hold.

Gellately additionally notes that unlike most other totalitarian regimes, the Nazis openly discussed their coercive system — in particular, their concentration camp system. I would add that it is striking that while most Soviet camps were hidden away in Siberia or elsewhere in the hinterlands, the Nazis opened their first camps near big cities. Similarly, the Nazis were quite open about their anti-Jewish measures and legislation, discussing these laws and rulings in widely circulated papers. The Nuremberg Laws (passed in 1935) were well discussed and widely publicized — as they would have to be: the populace would have to know that having sexual relations with Jews was now forbidden.

Gellately observes that German propaganda was well-crafted and effective, rather than crude and obvious. Here I would note that Goebbels articulated what is now widely acknowledged by propaganda theorists: effective propaganda is often if not typically an exercise in “confirmation bias”: it works best if it takes preexisting attitudes and beliefs and amplifies them, reconstructs them, and uses them to support something. He adds that the regime received thousands of letters a day, which seems to show that the populace supported or at least felt comfortable with it.

Groth offers a welter of criticisms of Gellately’s claims. He starts by noting that Nazi electoral successes actually dropped from 37.3% to 33.1% in the 1932 elections. Yes, a later election, after Hitler was appointed chancellor, showed a plurality of 43.9%, but that (Groth avers) was likely because of the pressure the SA could bring on voters. And in later plebiscites (in late 1933 and 1934), all opposition had been outlawed. Moreover, Groth points out that Stalin routinely won elections with 99% of the vote.

While most Soviet camps were hidden away in Siberia or elsewhere in the hinterlands, the Nazis opened their first camps near big cities.

To the point about the Nazi Party’s membership increasing, Groth replies that the postwar Soviet-backed Polish communist party membership rose from 20,000 to 1 million. As to the Nazis wanting popular backing, Groth replies that Stalin’s regime did as well.

Regarding Gellately’s claim that Hitler didn’t confront large segments of the German population in the way Stalin did the Soviet population, Groth scathingly replies that Hitler abolished trade unions and outlawed strikes — wasn’t that confrontational? To Gellately’s point about the Nazi anti-Semitism having taken root among Germans, Groth cites the reports of two senior British and American diplomats in Germany at the time of Kristallnacht (November 9, 1938) to the effect that all the citizens they talked to disapproved of the event completely.

Discussing the Nazis’ willingness to disclose the nature of their concentration camps system, Groth rightly observes that this was far short of full disclosure. The camps were portrayed as benignly reeducating communists, socialists, and criminals, and (later) as relocating Jews to the East for their own protection. The public was never told of the torture, rape, and murder that took place in those camps. Groth makes the telling point that not once did Hitler or his Propaganda Ministry ever acknowledge that they were systematically killing the Jews and other targeted groups.

Groth goes on to criticize Gellately’s account of Nazi propaganda as being sophisticated (not crude brainwashing and manipulation) and appealing to preexisting German beliefs and desires. Groth replies that this is a truism: any propaganda appeals to what people believe and desire — certainly Soviet, British, and American propaganda did. In this Groth is touching upon the point made earlier, that propaganda is often an exercise in confirmation bias. But he adds to this point another that is interesting:

Here one needs to take note of the symbiotic relationship between “propaganda” and “terror” in order to appreciate why the balance of these factors would predispose a great many people in Germany to deny and repress knowledge of Nazi crimes. At the top of the political system, Hitler and Goebbels set the norms of what it was that made a “good Nazi” and a “good German.” These norms were constantly replayed by the mass of official media — everything from radio to wall posters. Certainly, an “uncompromising hostility” to the Jews was one of the most important norms; ultimately in Hitler’s view, they were Germany’s most implacable and dangerous enemy. Any conspicuous, publicly, or even privately manifested deviation from the norms could potentially bring significant punishment to those involved. (142)

So if Germans didn’t publically defend Jews, Groth suggests, it is because any who did faced brutal treatment. And — he further suggests — the best way for an ordinary (non-anti-Semitic) German to bow to the authority of the regime but still maintain a favorable self-image would be to deliberately not think about the fate of the Jews. Actually, Groth could have invoked cognitive dissonance theory: faced with his belief in tolerance and his awareness that in not helping Jews he is contributing to their destruction, the tolerant German might simply tune out any new, unpleasant information. (Confirmation bias again . . .)

Groth next criticizes Gellately’s inferring from the fact that the Nazi regime received thousands of letters daily the conclusion that the German public was involved and interested rather than passive or powerless, and that the regime could be manipulated from below. Groth replies that the letters could just be “requests for personal favors, petty complaints, protestations of loyalty, and denunciations of other people” (143). And he criticizes Gellately’s data about citizen voluntary reports to the regime. All Gellately can point to is 403 total reports over a 12-year period — which is statistically insignificant, considering the population of Germany.

Any propaganda appeals to what people believe and desire — certainly Soviet, British, and American propaganda did.

Further, Groth notes that when the Gestapo acted, it didn’t wait for letters and other tips. When the von Stauffenberg assassination attempt failed, the Gestapo rapidly arrested the participants and used unrestrained torture, reprisals on families, and so on to get the names of the conspirators and their supporters. One estimate is that the Gestapo rapidly killed 5,000 people, most by simple fiat (no trials), including whole families of the principals.

Finally, Groth wonders whether, even supposing that 60% of the Germans continued to support Hitler even after Stalingrad, coercion wasn’t needed to suppress dissent in the other 40%. He notes that while the Vietnam War still had majority popular support in 1967, the street protests and the support given Senator McCarthy were enough to convince President Johnson not to run for reelection.

Groth agrees with Sarah Gordon that the regime didn’t so much rely on German public opinion as neutralize it, with a propaganda campaign aided by a communication monopoly, and the dictatorial coercion of the police state. And as the conclusion of the war became obvious to the whole population, and the obliteration of German cities more extensive, that coercion became all-important.

Groth concludes with an attack against Goldhagen and Gellately, holding that their view

validates a Nazi or neo-Nazi interpretation of the Fuhrer. He was a great leader of the German people because he carried out, or at least attempted to carry out, the most sincere and universal wishes and aspirations of the whole German nation.

In remembrance of Oskar Schindler, Hans and Sophie Scholl, Monsignor Bernhard Lichtenberg, Claus von Stauffenberg, and Konrad Adenauer, Hitler is not entitled to this presumption. Some facts about German public opinion on the Third Reich may perhaps forever remain in dispute. But holding a pistol to the head of a captive has certain moral . . . consequences for the assailant which cannot be removed by the argument that the pistol was not very large, and that if the captive had only been a little braver and more enterprising, it could have been dislodged. (152–3)

While I deeply respect Groth’s fair-mindedness regarding the question of German anti-Semitism and complicity in Nazi crimes (especially considering his personal story), let me make a few rebuttals to Groth’s attacks on Gellately, before presenting a deeper critique.

Let’s start with Groth’s criticism of Gellately’s general claim that while the regime’s propaganda machine and its coercive institutions helped keep people in line, the Nazi regime rested mainly on consensus. This claim Groth dismisses as “flawed analysis,” but is it? Hitler’s regime, after achieving power, dramatically delivered on its promises. It lowered unemployment (which dropped from over 30% in 1933 to virtually nothing by 1939), in great measure from a massive buildup in military and in infrastructure spending. This is what Gellately meant when he suggested that the regime’s real and seeming successes from 1933 to 1939 built popular support.

Hitler, sitting in his jail cell after a failed, farcical putsch, realized that both the Communist Left and the Nazi Right were unable to overthrow the government by revolution.

Imagine you are a German worker inclined to internationalism, socialism, or communism, and are initially skeptical about National Socialism. But Hitler achieves power, and lo! He apparently fulfills his economic promises. You and your friends have work, bread, sausage! Again, suppose you are a German businessperson, very nationalistic, but skeptical of (in your view) a group of rowdies led by an ex-corporal who don’t seem to represent German Glory, and call openly for socialism. But they achieve power, and behold! They do rebuild the military in defiance of the Treaty of Versailles, take back the Ruhr and annex the Sudetenland, and achieve union with Austria. In 1939, war does break out and you see the regime rapidly take half of Poland, and rapidly defeat France — erasing in your mind an historic grievance. You might well now support this regime you initially opposed.

Groth’s argument that Stalin was like Hitler in that Stalin, too, wanted popular support seems dismissive if not downright disingenuous. One obvious and huge difference between the two figures is that the Bolsheviks never once faced fair elections with real opponents. Lenin won a revolution, and Stalin climbed to the top of the resulting Byzantine power structure by adroitly killing off competitors. But Hitler, sitting in his jail cell after a failed, farcical putsch, realized that both the Communist Left and the Nazi Right were unable to overthrow the government by revolution — so he would have to appeal for votes. And Hitler and the Party hierarchy crafted an ideology accordingly — based on the identification of an International Jewish Order as the enemy, a stab-in-the-back Nazi Historical Narrative, protectionist economics, and socialist envy of the rich — together with a political platform built on ending unemployment and restoring the national military.

To Groth’s point that Stalin won 99% of the vote, whereas Hitler won only 44% in the last election with other parties allowed, and the 44% is suspect because of the activity of the SA: these points seem contradictory. The fact that the Nazis polled only 44% suggests that the election was fairly free after all. More generally, the elections make it clear that the Nazis were able to win the plurality of votes in free elections in margins between 33% and 40%. Groth needs to ask whether the Bolsheviks could have ever done that well at any point.

Any non-Jewish German couple being given an apartment previously owned by Jews would have to know or strongly suspect that the rightful owners would not be reclaiming their property.

Regarding Groth’s comments about those British and American diplomats in Germany at the time of Kristallnacht: again, we need to remember the problem of interviewer bias. Would the average German feel comfortable in expressing support for violent anti-Semitic demonstrations to foreign diplomats — especially from England and America, which according to Nazi ideology were bastions of International Jewish financial power? Indeed, did these diplomats talk to any German workers at all, and if so, how free would those workers have felt in answering the foreign diplomats?

To Groth’s point that the regime never admitted to its own people that it was killing the Jews, two replies are in order. First, any non-Jewish German couple being given furniture or (more obviously) an apartment previously owned by Jews would have to know or strongly suspect that the rightful owners would not be reclaiming their property, and would surely have known or suspected why. But if the people were so completely cowed by the regime’s police and convinced by propaganda, why wouldn’t it just tell the citizens the truth?

Moreover, I think Groth has the relationship between power (coercion) and propaganda somewhat muddled. The relation is symbiotic, but not as he describes it. The propaganda campaign helped solidify popular support for the regime, and make people compliant to its agenda. However, coercion doesn’t so make people want to watch propaganda — it removes the most effective weapon against propaganda: free speech. Specifically, absent the use of power (coercion, terror) to silence all countervailing views, the propaganda of any regime will not be effective long-term.

Critical voices can expose propaganda for what it is — sunlight disinfects — and this is why the coercive power of any authoritarian regime enables its propaganda to be effective. Imagine the damage the satirical power of a Saturday Night Live show could have inflicted on the Nazi Party and its ideology. Imagine if critics had been allowed to do their own documentary on Judaism and the Jews in reply to The Eternal Jew. Groth himself touches upon this when he says:

As long as the Nazis could maintain a communication monopoly supported by terror, the issue of their Jewish policy could be framed for public consumption in such euphemistic terms as “removal of Jews from Germany” and “resettlement of Jews in the East.” An opposition . . . would have framed the issue as mass murder and state-sponsored criminal mayhem. (150)

Finally, to Groth’s criticism that (Goldhagen’s and) Gellately’s view validates the Nazi idea of Hitler as hero, and that this betrays the memory of people who struggled against the regime, two replies. First, Groth cites six anti-regime fighters. But that was six out of 80 million people over a 12-year period — not much of a resistance. And the attempt on Hitler’s life involved military men who were worried about Hitler’s losing the war, not plagued by desperation to save the Jews. Second, maintaining that the very notion that Hitler delivered the goods to the average (non-Jewish) German validates the view of Hitler as a great leader is absurd. Yes, Hitler gave Germans the goods, but they were goods stolen from murdered people and colonized countries. That hardly “validates” Hitler.

Coercion doesn’t so make people want to watch propaganda — it removes the most effective weapon against propaganda: free speech.

In sum, I agree with Groth that the move to tar all or most Germans of the time with some special murderous kind of anti-Semitism is wrong. However, I don’t think he quite makes the case that there wasn’t anything unique about German anti-Semitic ideology. I will return to this point. But even more questionable is Groth’s feeling that Gellately was wrong to say the regime rested on consensus. To be fair to both Gellately and Groth, they were writing a few years before a more powerful explanation of the general support for the regime among the people: the regime purchased its support. Just how and how much the regime did this was not explained deeply until Götz Aly’s seminal research, to which I now turn.



[1] Doctors don’t typically bargain with patients in the sense of “If you quit smoking, I will lower my fees by 10%.” They may bargain about method of payment, and give discounts for fees paid by cash. But of course insurance companies routinely offer lower fees to patients who avoid risky behaviors.

[2] Listen to the Ridley interview here.

[3] The Wealth of Nations, book I, chapter 2.

[4] Groth doesn’t mention this, but in 1943 Polish underground hero Jan Karski told both leaders in person that the Jews were being exterminated.

[5] From her book: Hitler, Germans and the Jewish Question, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1984).

[6] From his book: The Experience of a Single German Town 1930–1935, New York: New Viewpoints (1965).

[7] From Friedlander’s book: Nazi Germany and the Jews, Vol. 1: The Years of Persecution, 1933–1939, New York: Harper Collins (1997).

[8] In his classic book, How to Lie with Statistics, New York: Norton (1954).

[9] The Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing the Racial Policy 1933–1945, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1990).

[10] Oxford: Oxford University Press (2001).


Editor's Note: This review-essay is part 1 of a three-part series.



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Disquieting Developments

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My father served in the Army Signal Corps, under General Patton, and participated in the liberation of one of the Nazi concentration camps. He and his fellow Signal Corpsmen photographed what he saw. As a young boy I found some of those grisly photos tucked away in the garage. They left an impression on me that lasts to this day — to this year’s Holocaust Remembrance Day, to be exact, when I decided to take some time to discuss the current state of anti-Semitism.

Europe is now witnessing a surge in anti-Semitism such as it has not seen since the Holocaust era of the 1930s and 1940s. This certainly shows up in European soccer matches, as a recent Washington Post article reports: the crowd at a game taunts the visiting fans from Amsterdam, a city with a historically large Jewish population, with chants such as “Hamas, Hamas, Jews to the gas” and “My father was in the commandos, my mother was in the SS, together they burned Jews, because Jews burn the best!” At another game, British spectators taunted a team often supported by Jewish fans with the chant “I’ve got a foreskin, how about you? F--- Jew!” In other games, players and fans have given an imitation Nazi salute (the “quenelle”) invented by a devoutly anti-Semitic French comedian named Dieudonne M’bala M’bala. The article cites a study showing that anti-Semitic incidents at European soccer games are at a record high.

Whenever there are demonstrations or riots in Muslim neighborhoods of European cities, the participants don’t scream “Death to Israel,” but “Death to Jews” and “Gas the Jews.”

More generally, as a recent US News & World Report piece put it, “From Toulouse to Paris, London to Berlin, Brussels to Copenhagen, Jews are being harassed, assaulted and even killed.” The report notes that a new study conducted by the Pew Research Center shows anti-Semitic attacks at a seven-year high. As of 2013, Jews have faced intimidation and even persecution in more than three-fourths of Europe — 34 out of 45 countries, to be exact. These attacks include desecration of synagogues and Jewish cemeteries, verbal slurs and physical assaults, and even murders — most recently of the Charlie Hebdo magazine staff and (right afterward) the killing of customers at a kosher food market.

The Pew survey indicates that currently 25% of all Europeans feel antipathy toward Jews. This result comports well with a 2013 survey reported in an article by Cathy Young. The survey was of 6,000 self-identified Jews living in eight EU countries, conducted by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. The results were both surprising and disturbing. The survey revealed that:

  • two-thirds of the respondents thought that anti-Semitism was a serious problem in their home countries;
  • three-fourths thought that anti-Semitism has increased over the last five years;
  • one-fourth reported being personally subjected to anti-Semitic bullying or attack;
  • nearly one-half reported being concerned about harassment;
  • two-thirds were afraid that their children would be harassed at school, or in transit to and from.

What is behind this swelling tide of European anti-Semitism? I think we can point to three groups: Muslim immigrants to Europe European leftists and European right-wing extremists.

This triumvirate of communities infected with large numbers of Jew-haters is explored in a recent report by the American Jewish Committee. As the report puts it, “Three distinct groups in France are noticeably more anti-Jewish than the overall population, according to two new public opinion surveys on French anti-Semitism. The groups are supporters of the National Front party (extreme right), to a lesser extent supporters of the Left Front coalition (extreme left), and members of the Muslim community.”

The article gives the results of polling conducted by the French think-tank Fondapol last year. They show that while about 25% of the French generally say Jews have too much power in the media, 33% of Left Front sympathizers, fully 51% of National Front sympathizers, and a mind-boggling 61% of French Muslims agree. Again, on the question of whether Jews use “Holocaust victim status” as an egoistic ploy, 35% of the whole French population agrees — already a shockingly high number — while 51% of Left Front supporters, 56% of Muslims, and a nauseating 62% of National Front supporters agree. Regarding the recent upsurge in violence against Jews, while 14% of the French public generally thought it was “understandable,” 29% of National Front supporters agreed, as did 21% of Left Front supporters, and 25% of Muslims.

The polls also showed that the degree of anti-Semitism among Muslims was directly proportional to the degree of self-reported religiosity.

Let’s examine these groups more closely.

Start with the Muslim European community. It is no shocking news to report that Europe in recent years has seen a massive increase in Muslim immigrants. As a recent Pew study reports, the Muslim percentage of Europe’s population has grown about 1% per decade, from constituting 4% of the EU population in 1990 to 6% in 2010. (In 2010, the total Muslim EU population was over 13 million.) The study projects that this will continue through 2030, when the Muslims will be 8% of the total population. France and Germany have the highest percentages of Muslims (at 7.5% and 5.8% respectively). And from that community has come most of the attackers of Jews.

The idea that the Left was sympathetic to the Jews after the Holocaust doesn’t comport with historical reality.

The polls I discussed earlier showed anti-Semitic sentiment strong among French Muslims. Other polls indicate that the same holds true of the rest of Europe. As a recent paper by Gunther Jikeli notes, many other surveys done throughout Europe confirm that there is a much higher level of anti-Semitism among Muslims than among non-Muslims (or the public at large). In a 2006 Pew study, Muslims in France, Germany, and Spain were twice as likely to have unfavorable views of Jews as were non-Muslims, while in Britain Muslims were seven times more likely. Jikeli reviews ten other studies conducted in a variety of ways in a variety of other European countries, all showing basically the same result.

It is often said that whatever hatred comes from elements of the Muslim immigrant community is created by Israel’s policies, specifically its occupation of the West Bank. I don’t find this claim plausible, for several reasons.

First, as the US News article noted, whenever there are demonstrations or riots in Muslim neighborhoods of European cities, the participants don’t scream “Death to Israel,” but “Death to Jews” and “Gas the Jews.”

Second, and more obviously, European Jews — i.e., precisely those Jews who have chosen to stay in their European homelands rather than immigrate to Israel — have virtually no influence over Israeli policies. So harassing, assaulting, and killing those Jews will certainly not change Israeli policy. And how crazy is it to think that desecrating the graves of long-deceased Jews could be motivated by the intention to protest against Israel and its various policies? I mean, if this were anger at Israeli policies, you would expect the attacks to be directed at Israeli embassies, not random Jewish graveyards.

Third, there has been tremendous antipathy toward the Jews in all Muslim lands since the inception, not of Israel, but of Islam itself. Anti-Semitism has been endemic in Islam throughout its existence for the same reason it has been endemic in Christianity throughout its existence. Judaism denies that Muhammed was a prophet and that Jesus was the Messiah. It is basically that simple. And we should note that the hatred Muslims often feel against the Jews for not accepting the Prophet is also directed at Christians (and Hindus, Zoroastrians, and so on) for the self-same reason.

None of this should be taken to mean that I think Israel’s state policies are now or have ever been above reproach, or that I think anybody who criticizes those policies is necessarily (or even likely) an anti-Semite. Of course everyone is free to criticize Israel — or America, Egypt, Iran, or any other country.

Islam itself was a colonialist creed. The Turkish Empire was hardly a Jewish one, to take the most recent case.

I just doubt the claim that Israel’s policies are the predominant cause of Islamic anti-Semitism. The existence of Israel is the current focus for that anti-Semitism, but the long-standing Muslim antipathy toward Jews would have remained even if Yasser Arafat had accepted the two-state solution negotiated by Bill Clinton some years back, and even if all Israelis moved to somewhere else tomorrow. As Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of the Islamist terrorist army Hezbollah, so charmingly put it: “If we searched the entire world for a person more cowardly, despicable, weak, and feeble in psyche, mind, ideology and religion, we would not find anyone like the Jew. Notice I do not say the Israeli.” Duly noticed.

Let’s now turn to another group responsible for the recrudescence of European anti-Semitism, the European Left. I want to start with addressing what I will call the New York Times Received Account. The name gives recognition to an NYT article written a couple of years ago by Colin Shindler.

In that piece (“The European Left and Its Trouble with the Jews”), Shindler began by noting the growth of anti-Semitic violence in France, such as the then recent firing of blanks outside a synagogue, Islamists tossing a grenade into a kosher restaurant, and the killing of a teacher and some children in a Jewish school. He then averred that much of the European Left had remained silent about these cases where “anti-Zionism spills over into anti-Semitism,” as he put it.

His thesis was that the Left was very sympathetic to Jews in the aftermath of the Holocaust, but started reversing itself with Israel’s “collusion with imperial powers like Britain and France during the Suez Crisis,” and only intensified during the 1970s with the Israelis building out settlements on the West Bank. By the 1990s, he added, many European Leftists began to view the growing Muslim immigrant population as “a new proletariat.”

I don’t find the Times Received View remotely persuasive (but then, very little of what emanates from the Great American Progressive Propaganda Organ seems persuasive to me). To begin with a couple of obvious quibbles, the idea that the Left was sympathetic to the Jews after the Holocaust doesn’t comport with historical reality. Certainly in the contest of the post-war Soviet Empire, as Daniel Hannan notes, Stalin’s pursuit of the “Doctors’ Plot” was intended to initiate a campaign targeting Jews with the goal of throwing massive numbers of them into his Gulag. Also, there were show trials of “Israeli spies” in both Czechoslovakia and Hungary, as well as purges of Jews by the Polish communist party.

Of course, much of the European Left did not support the Stalinist Soviet Empire. But much of the European Left did.

And the idea that the Left began to oppose Jews and side with the Muslims because Israel sided with imperial powers in 1956 doesn’t square with the fact that the European Left seems to have had little problem with Soviet imperialism (remember, the year 1956 also saw the Soviets butchering Hungarians who wanted freedom from their empire), or Chinese imperialism. Moreover, as Daniel Greenberg has observed, Islam itself was a colonialist creed. The Turkish Empire was hardly a Jewish one, to take the most recent case. And the empire that Iran is trying to put together (by controlling Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen) is again not a Jewish but a Shia Muslim one.

Anti-Semitic trends in socialism go back to the beginning.

But waive those points. Jews who have chosen to remain in Europe have no control of any kind over Israel’s policies. The main reason a person would allow his hatred of Israel’s policies — which are not universally accepted even by Israelis — to extend to all Jews would be that he is a Jew-hater to begin with.

And again, as Daniel Hannan has forcefully observed, anti-Semitic trends in socialism go back to the beginning. Pierre Leroux, the 19th-century leftist who coined the term “socialism,” trumpeted, “When we speak of Jews, we mean the Jewish spirit — the spirit of profit, of lucre, of gain, of speculation in a word the banker’s spirit.” The 19th-century German radical Wilhelm Marr embraced the term “anti-Semitic,” crowing, “Anti-Semitism is a Socialist movement, only nobler and purer in form than Social Democracy.” The 20th-century French socialist-communist Pierre Myrens had that, “The Yid is an Israelite by religion, a Jew by race, and what is more, a capitalist!”

Of course, the über-leftist himself, Karl Marx — whose father converted to Protestantism from Judaism, so would have been categorized as Jewish under the Nuremberg laws — held that “the essence of Judaism and the root of the Jewish soul is expediency and self-interest: the God of Israel is Mammon, who exposes himself in the lust for money.” He and his collaborator Engels wrote of the Polish Jews, “The Polish Jew-Usurer cheats, gives short weights, clips coins, engages in common swindling.” This from the “genius” revered in philosophy departments worldwide!

Jews themselves have often been politically leftist, but as a group they have historically been associated with capitalism (“money-lending”) in the European mind. And what defines the Left — from progressive liberalism, to socialism, to communism — is precisely the disapproval or loathing of capitalism.

Here of course is one of European history’s great ironies. You might call it the Catch-22 of Judaism in Europe. Jews were often barred from land ownership, membership in the trade guilds, and government service. They were, however, allowed to be peddlers, and otherwise to engage in business. They were allowed to do something Christians were forbidden to do: lend money at interest — to Christians. So Christian policy itself often drove Jews into business generally and banking in particular. Drove them into it — but condemned them for it.

Again, I want to add the caveat that while the European Left has been a wellspring of anti-Semitic sentiment, I don’t say that most European leftists harbored such feelings. I simply say that they are more likely to have such sentiments than the population as a whole.

Let’s finally consider the rise of ultra-Right parties in Europe. Over the past five years, they have been making rapid gains in membership and (accordingly) in representation in legislatures. Last year in particular saw these parties achieve major gains.

Christian policy itself often drove Jews into business generally and banking in particular. Drove them into it — but condemned them for it.

These parties fall into two broad categories: the ultra-right-wing, so to say, and the neo-Nazi. The Independence Party in the UK and the contemporary National Front in France, both to the right of what we would call conservative or neoliberal parties, are of the first category. The Golden Dawn Party in Greece and the Jobbik Party in Hungary are both in the second category. The difference between the two types of European radically right-wing parties is explored in an article by John Palmer a couple of years back.

The neo-Nazi parties mimic the German Nazi Party of yore. For example, the Golden Dawn party of Greece has its own version of the SA (Sturmabteilung), which delights in bullying immigrants and refugees. And the Jobbik party in Hungary delights in bullying the Roma (Gypsies). On the other hand, the UK Independence Party and the contemporary National Front don’t terrorize anybody, but instead oppose continued widespread immigration and want firmer measures to assimilate the recent immigrants.

Interesting here is the National Front in France. It has recently seen something of a power struggle between the founder of the party, Jean-Marie Le Pen, and his daughter Marine. The father has said a number of things that seem to show genuine anti-Semitism. For instance, he has spoken about making an “oven-load” of a Jewish singer. Regarding the Holocaust, which killed 6 million Jews, he has repeatedly made slighting comments, such as, “If you take a book of over a thousand pages on the Second World War, in which 50 million died, the concentration camps occupy two pages and the gas chambers ten or 15 lines, and that’s what one calls a detail.” Considering that of the 50 million people killed in WWII, at least 11 million died in the Nazi concentration camps, I don’t think we are talking about a detail meriting two pages out of 1,000. And he has said, “I’m not saying that the gas chambers didn’t exist. I couldn’t see them myself.” While not denying the concentration camps existed, Le Pen has clearly attempted to dismiss them, which seems odd for a person who had no anti-Semitic beliefs to do.

His daughter seems to have taken command of the party and distanced it from his anti-Semitism, focusing instead on anti-immigrationism. But even so, it seems clear that the long-term members of the party are more likely to harbor anti-Semitic beliefs than is the French public as a whole.

Now, in the European context, radical right-wing parties have a markedly different flavor from that which we Americans view as “right-wing.” Many Americans consider libertarians to be on the Right politically, but Europeans would more correctly view then as “liberal” advocates of minimal government. Most American conservatives, too, are distrustful of a powerful central government. But the European Right tends to favor economic statism and intense nationalism. What focuses their anger is the vision that many European leaders share of a “United States of Europe.”

The European Union started as a free trade zone (at which it was quite a success). Then it became a unified monetary zone (the success of which is bound to be severely tested, should Greece leave). But the goal of political union, in which the existing European nation states merge into one overarching state, sticks in the craw of the radical Right. (To get a sense of the intensity of the disagreement, you can listen to a recent heated debate between two Euroskeptics and two True Believers in a United States of Europe.)

There are plenty of reasons for even libertarians to distrust the idea of a unified European state. But one of the main reasons for the European Right lies in its own tribalist feeling of “volk,” of the people as an extended kinfolk bonded by blood as well as culture. Many of those who view immigrants as “outside the tribe” — i.e., as members of the out-group — also view Jews in this way as well. Jews are often seen by the ultra-rightists as being “cosmopolitan,” a code for saying that they aren’t really Germans (or French, or whatever). They are of “different blood.”

Add to this the traditional tie between the Right and the church in Europe, which brings in the element of Christian antipathy toward the Jews, and the attraction the fascist Right has toward socialism, with its suspicion of capitalism (and hence of “money-lending”), and you have a further source of anti-Semitism.

As Europe struggles economically, the radical Left and radical Right may continue to grow in number and political influence.

One point should be made explicitly and stressed. While the three European communities with the most anti-Semitic feeling are Muslims, leftists, and rightists, that of course does not necessarily mean that the majority of their members approve of Jews being physically attacked, or are even anti-Semitic. Reverting to one of the polls reported earlier, while 14% of the French generally say violence against Jews is “understandable” (which may or may not mean that those respondents approve of it), 21% of the Left Front, 25% of Muslims, and 29% of National Front say it is understandable. That in turn means that 79% of the Left Front, 75% of Muslims, and 71% of the National Front say that they do not believe anti-Jewish violence is understandable, much less approve of it.

That said, however, some other points must be made as well. First of all, the number of people agreeing to certain anti-Semitic statements (such as the one about Jews using the Holocaust as a victimhood ploy) does reach majority support among the three groups. Also, it is quite likely that many people who really do believe violence against Jews is understandable (and perhaps even deserved) will not want to admit that to a pollster. Almost surely, the reported percentages are lower than the real ones.

Further, as Europe struggles economically, the radical Left and radical Right may continue to grow in number and political influence. Should Greece leave the Eurozone, and should this lead to financial crisis, these groups may increase their influence. And regardless of Europe’s short-term financial future, the Muslim population is likely to continue to grow. In view of these trends, I think that the level of European anti-Semitism will probably be rising as well.

In short, though Holocaust Remembrance Day has come and gone, there is much still to ponder, and it is deeply disquieting.




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Mudblood

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In the August 2010 issue of Liberty I wrote an essay about racism. But that article was largely theoretical. Now I would like to share my personal experiences about the topic.

To do so I must first disclose my own racial identity. I am what might be called a mutt or a mulatto, although I prefer the term “mudblood,” which is the Harry Potter name for wizards who come from Muggle bloodlines. My mother is a white American woman of Russian Jewish lineage, and my father is a Muslim man with brown skin who immigrated to the United States from Bangladesh. My parents were married at the time of my birth but later divorced. My childhood religious and cultural education was a mixture of Judaism and Islam, although I never felt completely comfortable among either Jews or Muslims and as an adult I have abandoned organized religion. I have light brown skin but I am sometimes able to “pass for white.”

For my reader’s education let me mention that Bangladesh is a country with a population of mostly Muslim brown-skinned people located on the Indian subcontinent. (I doubt that I need to explain where Russian Jews come from.) What insight into race relations do I have as one of the world’s few part-Bangladeshi-Muslim, part-Russian-Jewish people?

The amazing thing about knowing Jews and Muslims is how distorted and out of touch with reality are the stereotypes and preconceived notions that some people have about members of other racial groups. Let me discuss the Bangladeshi stereotype first.

What most Americans know about Bangladesh, if anything, is that we are Muslims. Many Americans believe that most Muslims are Islamic fundamentalists who oppress women and support terrorism. My experience is that Bangladeshi Muslims are all different kinds of people, each with an individual identity. A minority of Bangladeshis are deeply religious, Islamic conservative fundamentalists. Some Bangladeshis are modern-liberal or leftist Muslims. However, I have found that most of the Bangladeshis whom I know are religious but not fanatical. I strongly believe that most Bangladeshis do not sympathize with or support Islamic terrorists. In fact, Bangladesh has something right now that the United States has never had, a female head of government.

If race has so little conceptual value for understanding people, then why do people make such a big fuss over it?

On the other hand, what can I say about Jews? Aside from a general enjoyment of gefilte fish and matzah ball soup and the other festive ornaments of Yiddish culture, the Jews whom I have known each have different individual personalities with traits that could not be predicted on the basis of knowing that they are Jews. I do not believe that most Jews are unusually smart or that most Jews are greedy, although the argument can be made that Jewish culture places a high value upon learning and intelligence and is conducive to a successful career as a lawyer. I recall with a certain fondness the Jewish custom of Hanukkah gelt, which is children's chocolate wrapped up to look like gold coins. I also recall pressure to study Hebrew and read Jewish books, but it is a stretch to find some special meaning in those customs. I regard “smart” and “greedy” as compliments, but I have known Jews who are neither. Yet some people have bizarre stereotypical pictures of Jews, as if all were identical.

When you have no firsthand knowledge of something it is easy to have a two-dimensional understanding of it. If I have any insight to offer it is that no two people are the same, and racial or ethnic generalizations have no relation whatsoever to how any real human being behaves. There is a notorious academic argument that if you were forced to form a basketball team to win money it would be logical to include no one but African-Americans. I suspect that athletic talent varies widely among blacks, and the idea in question is a thinly disguised excuse for racism. It is plausible to think that bigotry and racial hatred begin innocently enough as a crude cognitive technique of relying on racial generalizations for the purpose of understanding people. But this evolves into racism as the natural result of thinking about humans in terms of groups rather than individuals. I believe that racial stereotypes have no predictive accuracy.

If race has so little conceptual value for understanding people, then why do people make such a big fuss over it? One likely reason is that if race blindness were prevalent then the people who purport to speak for oppressed racial minority groups, the leaders of the racial special interests, would have no power. Unlike some libertarians, I have always believed that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was a hero and that the civil rights movement was a good thing. But I believe this only because in the Jim Crow South, blacks were second-class citizens who were not legally equal to whites. Segregation was the result of racist laws as well as the actions of racist owners controlling their private property. In my opinion, the civil rights movement was a success. Blacks achieved legal equality. There are still parts of America where racism is common, and I have been told that some data suggest that certain areas of the United States have noticeable numbers of white racist police officers. But the use of the machinery of government to enforce racist laws has disappeared in the United States, and this precisely is the victory of the civil rights movement.

Now, in the post-civil rights era, socialist blacks such as Al Sharpton and Cornel West have hijacked the civil rights movement and preach to the members of racial minorities that we remain locked in a racial war against the white supremacist conservative Republicans. They claim that the Democratic Party with its modern liberalism is the only place where we can find refuge and protection from the evils of the white racists. The desired protection takes the form of special programs to favor non-whites, or certain non-whites. This is an Orwellian nightmare — like saying that racial equality is our ideal but non-whites should be more equal than whites.

It is up to us to fight on behalf of individualism as the solution to racism by arguing that what matters about people is their individual personalities and not their race.

It is probably true that there are more pro-white racists in the Republican Party than in the Democratic Party, but I think that the American Right is a racially diverse group of people. Most conservatives, and the vast majority of libertarians, are good people who oppose racism. Only a small but vocal minority on the Right are Nazis or Klansmen who give the Right a bad name. It is worth noting that at various times in American history the Democratic Party was associated with the racist South and the Republican Party with the slave-freeing North. It is merely another absurd stereotype to say that the “average” right-winger is a white racist.

It is clear that racism and racial stereotypes have their philosophical basis in the doctrine that people are defined by their memberships in groups. If there is any hope of ending the blight of racism, it will come by taking an individualist approach. We libertarians are the world’s best advocates for individualism, and it is up to us to fight on behalf of individualism as the solution to racism by arguing that what matters about people is their individual personalities and not which race they are members of. I think that individualism will ultimately produce more diversity than state-sponsored affirmative action, because individualism attacks the root cause of racism, whereas affirmative action merely treats the external symptoms.

My friends in high school used to tell me that I should bomb my own car, and there have been many times when I got the sense from some Jews that they didn’t like me because I was Muslim, and received the same feeling from Muslims who did not like my being Jewish. I have never been beaten up as a result of racism (although my father has, and my maternal ancestors endured the Russian pogroms), but my entire life I have felt abnormal because it was not easy for me to fit into a traditional established role as a member of a specific race. I cannot be “a Jew” or “a Muslim” or “a white person” or “a dark-skinned person,” although I can be on the receiving end of discrimination against all of those categories. But it is still possible for me to be “an individual.” And being an individual is what each member of every different race on the planet has in common. It is what unites us and brings us together.

It’s liberating to be a mudblood, and it’s comforting to think that there are libertarians out there in the world who believe in individualism and represent the possibility that the human race will one day outgrow the abomination of racism.




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